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Executive Summary 
This case study report, ‘Does media policy promote media freedom and independence? The 
case of Germany’ is the second report on Germany from the European Union-funded 
MEDIADEM project. While the first report, the ‘Background information report. The case of 
Germany’, published in October 2010, provides an overview of the current media landscape 
in Germany, this report focuses on media policy’s processes and actors and their impact on 
the promotion of media freedom and independence. The objective of this report is to study the 
policy processes and the formulation or implementation of regulatory tools and policy 
instruments that either promote or constrain the development of free and independent media. 
We have placed the core notion of this report, free and independent media, in the context of 
democratic societies. This is because media freedom and independence do not constitute 
absolute terms without any relationship to the environment the media works in. The 
MEDIADEM project is based on the assumption that the primary, overarching role of the 
media in a democratic society is to function as an agent of information and public debate that 
facilitates the functioning of democracy. The terms are thus employed in relation to the 
media’s function in a democracy. It is clear from the outset that media freedom and 
independence are prone to various constraints. They can stem from the political sphere, from 
economic actors, from the media operators, or from the audience itself and will be illustrated 
here. 
This report is based mainly on empirical research with reference to legal acts, judgments, 
parliamentary motions and other parliamentary documents, media experts’ studies and 
research reports, statements of media operators and journalist associations, twenty-five expert 
interviews as well as supplementary academic literature. The information gathered was 
critically analysed and contextualised within the media policy discourse. 
The first chapter provides an overview of the values and actors at work in media policy 
formation and implementation to outline the broad field of the German media policy 
landscape. These values and actors are then succinctly analysed against the background of the 
concept of a free and independent media. While it became clear during the research that the 
multitude of national and European actors and media policy forums renders it difficult to 
present a coherent picture, some underlying basic currents could be carved out. Media policy 
processes of structural regulation to engender free and independent democratic discourses are 
addressed in the second chapter, followed by an analysis of content regulation in the third 
chapter. The difficult coexistence of public service and private broadcasting, the economic 
situation faced by print media and the technical, media policy, and legal repercussions 
brought by the advent of the Internet are also illustrated. The report concludes with a 
discussion of the conditions of the journalistic profession and their role in fostering or 
constraining free and independent media and media competency initiatives in Germany. 
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1. Introduction 
Democratic states and democratic societies require democratic personalities, which can 
evolve and develop through personal and transpersonal, thus public, communication. 
Personalities participating in democratic processes need to be informed and to acquire both 
the ability and the wish to communicate.1 In the first report for the MEDIADEM project, the 
‘Background information report. The case of Germany’ (Müller and Gusy, 2010: 192), we 
presented a brief summary of the existing media structures and regulations in Germany which 
frame public communication. This case study report on Germany explores media policy 
developments, its actors, and the results of these factors.2 As a guiding question throughout, 
our main focus lies on the democratic function of free and independent media and how the 
necessary communicative spaces are created, especially as these spaces are constituted anew 
with new individuals, new technical means (such as the Internet), and new subjects, thus 
requiring changes to the regulatory framework.  
 Due to its salience for open and democratic societies, the Federal Constitutional Court 
has declared that the expression and imparting of opinions and freedom of information are 
human rights enshrined in the Constitution and that the exercise of these rights requires 
constitutional protection.3 Communication can take place privately and publicly. With regard 
to public communication, free and independent media play a crucial role in public mass 
communication and thus ideally unbiased opinion forming. The notion of free and 
independent media requires that media freedom from the state be respected and guaranteed. 
However, other interests, from both state actors and private entrepreneurs, pull at the 
foundation of the media landscape, leading to the conclusion that a free and independent 
public sphere must be ensured and regulated to a certain degree. Regulation may comprise of 
different types (self regulation, co-regulation and state regulation4), ranging from independent 
press councils to state regulation of public service broadcasting. A media system can be 
organised in different ways to enable efficient democratic discourse. As is exemplified in the 
case of the German media landscape, it can be both the heavily regulated public service 
broadcasting or, in other ways, the privately organised press that engender free and 
independent journalism of a high quality. Whether and how free and independent journalism 
might be achieved, what actors are involved in the formulation and implementation of media 
regulation and what interests steer the policy debate are the key questions we will address in 
this report. The analysis will use as a starting point the core idea of the MEDIADEM project: 
how media systems can be organised in a way that enables free and independent discourse as 
an intrinsic element of democratic societies and whether they are in fact organised in this way. 
Or, to reiterate the MEDIADEM theoretical report, ‘This project is interested in the media as 
an institution specifically in the context of a democratic society. (…) With this premise, this 
project centres on those processes of media policy formulation and implementation that 
promote democratic media, focusing specifically on aspects of media freedom and 
independence (…)’ (Anagnostou, Craufurd Smith and Psychogiopoulou, 2010: 11).5 
                                                 
1 Based on a script of a talk given by H. Rossen-Stadtfeld, ‘The EU state aid decision on the German Public 
Service Broadcasters’ online activities’, conference The Internet: Between cultural value and economic good, 
Berlin, 22-23 September 2011. 
2 Besides legal and parliamentary documents and academic studies, this report is based on interviews with 
twenty-five experts. We would like to thank all interviewees for helping us with their knowledge, experience and 
insight regarding media policy and media policy processes. We also thank the presenters and participants in the 
conference ‘The Internet: Between cultural value and economic good’, which took place in Berlin, 22-23 
September 2011. Without the input of all of these people, this report could not have been written. 
3 Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 16 June 1981, no. 1 BvL 89/78, in BVerfGE 57, 295, at p. 319. 
4 A differentiated model of regulation and incentives propose Schulz and Held, 2011: 44. 
5 A theoretical background of the notion of freedom and independence with regard to media regulation is 
provided in the study by the Hans-Bredow-Institut et al., 2011: 13-37. 
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The German Basic Law, the interpretations of the Federal Constitutional Court and the 
law of the European Union provide the legal framework in which media policy develops. 
They describe and also confine the playing field of the actors involved in the formulation and 
implementation of media policy. As set out above, free and independent media are intrinsic to 
a democratic society. This intrinsic character applies to traditional forms of press and 
broadcasting as well as electronic and combined thus converged forms of media.6 From that 
angle, and this shall form the focus of this report, the Constitution requires a state with a free, 
comprehensive and objective media system, in which no single group predominates and free 
and independent public discourse can take place. This includes, of course, cultural and 
entertaining outlets as well.  
However, it would be naïve to believe that the national legal system remains 
unchanging and that simply because of the existence of a legal framework a media system 
works in a way that makes independent democratic discourse possible. Firstly, European 
actors such as the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
European Court of Human Rights influence and form the national legal system and thus the 
national media system. Although the German Federal Constitutional Court still holds a 
decisive position, the European courts complement its jurisdiction. The possible tensions of 
this multilevel relationship erupt occasionally, as it can be seen in the wake of the von 
Hannover and Görgülü judgments from the European Court of Human Rights (Frowein, 
2005; Wildhaber, 2005).7 Secondly, an important attribute of the media market is its 
economic salience. Several ten thousands of employees and freelancers work in the media 
market in Germany (Deutscher Journalisten Verband, 2008: 53; Weischenberg, Malik and 
Scholl, 2006: 36) and together public and private broadcasters yield annual turnovers of more 
than 18 billion euros (Media Perspektiven. Basisdaten, 2010: 7; Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 46). These numbers illustrate the forces at work within the 
media market. Thirdly, the media attract the attention of state and political actors, as well as 
commercial actors, as they influence in many cases our daily behaviour in shopping, ways of 
thinking and deciding who to vote for in elections. The debate surrounding the power of 
search engines and their influence on information access (Machill and Beiler, 2007; Kühling 
and Gauß, 2007), which has taken place in Germany as well as other states, illustrates this 
point. Finally, technical developments significantly shape the media market. The initial 
creation of private broadcasting was possible due to the then new means of cable and satellite 
transmissions. Today, the Internet allows new market models and poses challenges to media 
policy. To manage the partly antagonistic interests and forces in the media market, media 
policy must produce effective regulatory tools. The main tasks of media policy are to balance 
the various interests involved, create a functioning free and independent public sphere and to 
ensure a viable and sustainable market. 
 Focusing on media policy processes, this report commences in Chapter 2 with a 
presentation of the values and actors at work in German media policy. This is followed in 
Chapter 3 by an analysis of current debates on the structure of the media market, in which 
issues surrounding the advent and influence of the Internet play a major role. Positive 
measures and competing interests and legal restraints regarding content diversification are 
addressed in Chapter 4. This chapter analyses developments in public and private service 
broadcasting regarding news and information as well as restrictions stemming from law in 
general, such as criminal law. Chapter 5 explores the journalism profession as a key factor in 
                                                 
6 Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 5 August 1966, no. 1 BvR 586/62, NJW 1966, p. 1604; Council of 
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Indicators for media in a democracy, Resolution 1636 (2008) of 3 October 
2008. 
7 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), von Hannover v. Germany, judgment of 28 July 2005, no. 
59320/00; ECtHR, Görgülü v. Germany, judgment of 26 February 2004, no. 74969/01. 
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free and independent media while Chapter 6 provides some observations regarding media 
literacy. 
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2. Values and actors of media policy 
Before exploring the values of media policy, as enshrined in the German constitution, the 
German Basic Law, and many other legal and policy texts, and presenting the array of actors 
that participate in media policy, one paramount characteristic of German media policy must 
be observed: media policy is a complex and very diverse field of actors and forums that 
interact and interrelate, shaping both phases of media policy, the formulation and 
implementation of statutory regulation, as well as co-regulation and self-regulation. This 
situation renders the presentation of the multitude of institutions and persons involved in the 
process and their interests challenging. Any description must simplify matters in order to 
allow conclusions, but it has the advantage to carve out on a theoretical level the main 
currents of debate and some predominant actor constellations. 
 
2.1 Values of media policy 
Media policy is premised on different interests and values, partly complementary, partly being 
detrimental to one another. As was said in the introduction, it falls into the remit and 
responsibility of media policy to balance, or, where necessary, confine these forces. Bearing 
in mind the project’s objective to identify the factors that foster or impede free and 
independent media in a democracy, it seems appropriate to describe the role and function of 
the media in a democratic society as a core value of media policy in Germany. In such a 
society, free and independent media serve the process of opinion shaping in political matters 
by allowing different views to be promoted equally.8 Enshrined in the German Basic Law, 
receiving and imparting opinion is protected and the media as an institution is guaranteed.9 
Departing from this, over the last few decades the Federal Constitutional Court has 
developed a constitutional legal framework within which media policy operates. Forming a 
differentiated corpus of legally binding rules, some principles are repeated constantly, and, 
with regard to the democratic function of the media, the Court has reiterated that a free and 
independent press is constitutive for a democracy. Complementing this, mass media in the 
form of broadcasting are required to provide an unbiased basis for individual and public 
opinion forming.10 The freedom of broadcasting thus serves the public by enabling a 
comprehensive and encompassing room for discourse.11 Thus, one core value of media policy 
can be described as the need to ensure free and independent media to impart politically 
relevant information and not just entertainment. 
At the same time, media systems need to be sufficiently financially endowed. This 
points to the second core value of German media policy, which is its economic aspect. It is a 
simple truth that a publisher of a newspaper or a broadcaster needs revenue to pay employees, 
normally journalists, and that public service broadcasters are dependent on some kind of 
licence fee. Very briefly, sufficient finance enables the media to carry out its activities 
independently without being subjected to financial constraints. Simultaneously, unrealistic 
economic expectations or short-term interests might act to the media’s detriment. A main 
concern and thus a core value of media policy addresses the economic foundation of the 
media system, implicating a finance regime for mass media – i.e. German public service 
                                                 
8 See only Art. 11 para. 1 and 2; Art. 25 para. 1 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia 
[Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, 2010] (hereafter: Interstate Broadcasting Treaty); Art. 4 para. 1 Interstate Treaty on 
Broadcasting in Berlin and Brandenburg [Staatsvertrag über die Rundfunkanstalt Berlin-Brandenburg, 2009]; 
Art. 6 para. 3 and 4 Interstate Treaty of the South-West-Broadcasting [Staatsvertrag über den Südwestrundfunk, 
2011]. 
9 Art. 5 Basic Law [Grundgesetz, 2010]. 
10 BVerfGE 57, 295 at p. 319. 
11 BVerfGE 57, 295 at p. 320. 
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broadcasting – as well as concentration and merger regulation for private media operators and 
regulation to contain the economic influence of public service broadcasters.12 Regulation that 
seeks to contain the economic influence of public service broadcasters essentially seeks to 
reduce the risk that public service broadcasting services foreclose otherwise viable market 
options. As the media is perceived to be crucial for a democratic society, plurality of opinion 
and high standards of journalistic and editorial work are also to be safeguarded as well. 
Therefore, economic impacts must also be contained or even curtailed when posing a threat to 
this function.  
Another important aspect regarding free and independent media lies in its freedom 
from the state. The role of the media in a society renders it prone to the risk of undue state or 
party political influence on coverage in broadcast programmes, online or in the printed press. 
While a private publisher can freely decide to take a specific stance in a political debate – and 
this is a prevalent practice - state or partisan influence may also occur within public service 
broadcasting. To delineate between due and undue influence, the Federal Constitutional Court 
derived from the German Basic Law the principle of state independence.13 To ensure free and 
independent media in the case of public service broadcasting, state or party representatives are 
neither to be given decisive representation in broadcasters’ managing bodies nor permitted to 
plan programmes and decide what to air.14 Despite its difficult and sometimes imperfect 
implementation, the principle of state independence constitutes an important value in German 
media policy. 
Supplementing this, transparency and credibility are two important premises for free 
and independent media in a democracy. Consequently, German media law provides 
regulatory mechanisms for broadcasting and self-regulatory mechanisms for print media, in 
order to ensure basic journalistic principles, including the differentiation of opinion and 
conjecture from fact and an obligation to report truthfully.15 Comparable legislation exists for 
online content, depending on its source (the traditional press, broadcasting or individual 
blogs).16 Scientific journals and state media authorities publish comprehensive information on 
ownership structures (Media Perspektiven. Basisdaten, 2010: 28; Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 53), which allows for gauging the possible interests of private 
media owners, although such information is generally addressed to professionals and thus 
does not necessarily foster public debate on media transparency. However, as public opinion 
shaping influences political decisions and elections, setting an agenda or campaigning on 
certain issues through the media is a potentially entice prospect.17 This brings up the question 
as to how the lines between public relations and journalistic work can blur.  
A less structural and more content-orientated value can be deduced from the extensive 
case law on the protection of personal rights. Based on the dignity of the human being, the 
                                                 
12 Art. 11d Interstate Broadcasting Treaty regarding online activities of public service broadcasters; Art. 26 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty regarding media concentration; Art. 35-38 Act against Competition Constraints 
[Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 2011] regarding unfair competition practices of publishers. 
13 BVerfGE 57, 295, at p. 320. 
14 Art. 20a para. 3 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty prohibits public bodies, like governments, from running their 
own broadcasting stations; composition rules in state broadcasting acts seek to prevent governments and political 
parties from gaining control in the governing bodies. See only Art. 17 Interstate Treaty on North-German-
Broadcasting [Staatsvertrag über den Norddeutschen Rundfunk, 2005] and, more critical, Art. 21 Interstate 
Treaty of the Second German Television [ZDF-Staatsvertrag, 2009]. 
15 Publizistische Grundsätze (Pressekodex) vom Deutschen Presserat, in: Deutscher Presserat (ed.), Jahrbuch 
2011 [Yearbook 2011] (2011), S. 136; Art. 7 para. 3 and Art. 10 para. 1 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
16 Art. 54 para. 2 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
17 An investigation into the nuclear industry’s strategy by the newspaper ‘die tageszeitung’ illustrates a campaign 
initiated to change the public stance towards nuclear energy before and in the wake of the federal election in 
2009. See Kaul and Heiser, 2011: 16-18. 
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Constitutional Court again paved the way for a legal approach for addressing cases in which 
the interests of the individual must be fairly adjusted against the public interest to receive 
information.18 The Federal Constitutional Court and the respective civil court’s tasks include 
protecting the dignity and thus the personal rights of individuals as an important value in 
German media policy.  
Finally and very importantly, technical aspects merit attention. Media policy has 
always been connected to the development and inception of technical novelties. This was 
witnessed during the 1980s with satellite and cable television, giving place to a plethora of 
television and radio channels and the associated new media law developments, and it can be 
witnessed now with the effects of the fast development of the Internet with its new media 
services online and convergence of platforms. 
 
2.2 Actors of media policy 
 
2.2.1 General overview 
To formulate and implement state regulation, co-regulation and self-regulation and to ensure 
free and independent media, many different actors with varying remits and salience are 
involved.19 The political landscape, the legal tradition, the historic events after World War II, 
the deregulation in the 1980s and the resulting dual (or bifurcated) broadcasting system, the 
accession to the European Union, and the diverse media landscape itself all play a role in this 
situation. Thus, the main attribute of Germany’s media policy lies in its diversity. It can even 
be argued that no consistent and comprehensive German media policy exists. The various 
fields dealing with media policy range from measures to enhance media diversity, including 
public service broadcasters, as provided for in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 2005,20 and technical discussions 
regarding net neutrality within the European Union, to questions of audiovisual legislation at 
the state level and draft legislation on intellectual property law and the protection of 
information sources at the federal level. While all different policy actors seek to partake in the 
development of the media and in the media itself, not all of them seek to promote free and 
independent media as necessary in a modern democracy. This is for a range of different 
reasons. Some of the dynamics will be described briefly here. 
 
2.2.2 Actors and processes 
In order to present the state actors shaping and implementing media policies one has first to 
set out the political system.21 Germany as a federal state consists of sixteen states and the 
federal state, both of which are independent judicial entities. The federal state and the sixteen 
states all have a parliament, a government and an administration. Legislation regarding print 
media and the broadcasters, both private and public, falls into the remit of the sixteen states. 
The role of the state governments22 is to formulate the backbone of the broadcasting order via 
                                                 
18 Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 24 February 1971, no. 1 BvR 435/68, in BVerfGE 30, 173. Recent 
decision: Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 14 September 2010, no. 1 BvR 1842/08, NJW 2011, p. 740. 
19 Puppis provides a systematic overview of the national, European and global actors in media policy: Puppis, 
2007: 115. 
20 UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Paris, 20 
October 2005. 
21 See Hesse, 1999: 96 for further information. 
22 See the website of the conference of the head of the states, currently residing with the state government of 
Schleswig-Holstein, http://www.schleswig-holstein.de/MPK/DE/MPK_node.html, accessed 8 November 2011. 
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the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (hereafter: Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty).23 It can be derived from procedures and their outcome, the Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty in particular, that a free and independent media constitutes a core value. The principle 
of independence from the state as well as programme autonomy is implemented for both 
private and public service broadcasters. However, negotiations surrounding the enacting of 
the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty and amendments to it also testify to a democratic deficit. 
Amendments are prepared solely in closed circles of state governments and are barely 
scrutinised by state parliaments. The state secretary offices attached to the state prime 
minister prepare amendments to the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty in an essentially bipartisan 
procedure involving conservative and social democratic politicians. The state’s prime 
ministers have to agree upon the formulation and any amendments and sign the Interstate 
Broadcasting Treaty. As last step, the sixteen state parliaments must enact – without the 
possibility of making any changes - the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty, which then comes into 
force. Very rarely, as happened with the 14th Amendment of the Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty,24 a state parliament may reject the proposal, compelling all heads of the states to 
repeat the whole procedure. In addition, the number of well informed and truly competent 
media politicians is paradoxically very small, although parliamentarians in all sixteen state 
parliaments must enact the proposed legislation and thus are confronted with and accountable 
for the legislative outcome. Interestingly, the field of media policy does not attract many 
politicians, firstly because the issues dealt with require thorough expertise that is difficult and, 
moreover, time-consuming, to acquire and secondly, because the electorate does not ascribe it 
high importance. 
The state influence on the preparation of the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty renders it 
prone to undue influence and may have an effect on free and independent media. The remit of 
public service broadcasters is regularly the subject of media policy discussions instigated by 
single state actors, as through a curtailment of the mandate activities cost might be reduced.25 
As the public service broadcasters’ remit forms the core basis for their activities, any 
curtailment might affect their freedom and independence. Currently, state governments show 
no serious plans to enact a new public service broadcaster remit. 
The Federal Government and the Federal Parliament enact legislation on general law, 
such as criminal law, and on technical questions. It is also the Federal Parliament that 
generally triggers political debates on media freedom.26 While the constitutional principle of 
the necessity of free and independent media to democracy essentially shapes federal media 
policy, general law and technical issues may contradict this principle and work to limit free 
and independent media. The practical implications for journalists’ daily work play an 
important role here. Criminal law procedures, for example, can impel journalists and editors 
to disclose confidential material and thus thwart the important journalist-source relationship. 
As the Internet has become an important means of imparting and receiving opinions and 
information, its organisational and technical features directly and instantly influence the 
                                                 
23 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (Interstate Broadcasting Treaty) [Staatsvertrag für 
Rundfunk und Telemedien (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag – RStV), 2010]. 
24 14th Interstate Treaty to amend Interstate Treaties on Broadcasting, here on the Protection of Human Dignity 
and the Protection of Minors in Broadcasting and in Telemedia. Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen, Drs. 15/17 of 6 
July 2010. Rejected by the state parliaments of North-Rhine Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein. For North-
Rhine Westphalia see Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen, Plenarprotokoll 15/20 of 16 December 2010, p. 1720. 
25 Interview with Dr. Johannes Beermann, promedia, of 4 February 2011. 
26 This was the case in the request of the Social Democratic Party in the Federal Parliament for information on 
how the Federal Government intends to protect and ensure media pluralism and independence. See Deutscher 
Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung. Vorhaben der Bundesregierung zur Sicherung der Medienvielfalt und 
Medienfreiheit of 23 August 2011, Drs. 17/6836. Regarding freedom of media and press in the European Union 
see also the request of the Social Democratic Party: Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung. Zur 
Lage der Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit in der Europäischen Union of 14 March 2011, Drs. 17/5075. 
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transmission of information. The free and independent communication necessary in a 
democracy has become interrelated with the technical means of the Internet. The 
Telecommunications Act,27 amended in October 2011, provides the technical framework for 
telecommunications in Germany.28 This means crucial issues are and will be decided at the 
federal level. This includes, for example, issues such as the rules surrounding broadband 
transmissions and Internet neutrality. In addition, a Committee on Internet and Digital Society 
has been established at the federal level within the German Federal Parliament to discuss 
technical and content-related issues.29  
The national courts’ decisions and judgments assume differentiated tasks regarding 
media freedom and independence. They foster the principle of free and independent media, 
while concurrently implementing criminal provisions or privacy rights and thus curtailing 
media freedom. The Federal Constitutional Court has actually created most of the legally 
binding framework within which media policy develops through the way it has interpreted 
Article 5 of the Basic Law. The Court created with its founding interpretation the legal 
structure for the mass media and thus the basis for free and independent media. Concurrently, 
it has had to balance opposing interests, such as privacy versus public interest. 
Another forum for media policy has been created at the European level. Both the 
Council of Europe and the European Union espouse the idea of free and independent media 
being necessary in a democracy, albeit with different emphases. The Council of Europe’s 
legal approach lies in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). As is the case with the 
national courts, the ECtHR’s role is to ensure free and independent media, but also to balance 
opposing rights. The ECtHR’s judgments enjoy a binding quality on all state organs in 
Germany, including the courts (Meyer-Ladewig and Petzold, 2005: 15).30 This concedes it an 
influential position. The influence of the ECtHR is especially evident in the case Hannover v. 
Germany31 that dealt with the concept of public figures. Until then, the protection of public or 
well-known persons’ privacy rights had been restricted. In practice, such persons’ means of 
impeding publication of photographs was limited compared to other, less well-known, 
persons. Less important, but no less interesting, are the resolutions and recommendations of 
other Council of Europe organs on freedom of expression and information in the media and 
on indicators for media in a democracy.32 Unfortunately, as can also be observed regarding 
other Council of Europe activities, their political influence in Germany is limited.  
The European Union and its decision-making organs and political forums have 
incrementally become important actors regarding free and independent media, although by 
means of a more economic approach. Some developments merit attention. Article 11 of the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights now provides for a legal obligation to ensure 
media plurality and the European Parliament has adopted a resolution which addresses, 
amongst other issues, the need for and the function of free and independent media in 
democracy33 in the Member States. As for the media system in Germany, the European 
Commission inhabits a very tangible and far-reaching position with its state aid review 
                                                 
27 Telecommunication Act [Telekommunikationsgesetz, 2010]. 
28 Deutscher Bundestag, Drs. 17/7521 of 26 October 2011 and Plenarprotokoll.17/136 of 27 October 2011, p. 
16099. 
29 Deutscher Bundestag, Einsetzung einer Enquete-Kommission “Internet und digitale Gesellschaft”, Drs. 17/950 
of March 3, 2010. 
30 Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 14 October 2004, no. 2 BvR 1481/04, NJW 2004, p. 3407. 
31 ECtHR, Hannover v. Germany, judgment of 24 June 2004, no. 59320/00. 
32 Council of Europe, PACE, Resolution 1636 (2008) of 3 October 2008; PACE, Recommendation 1506 (2001) 
of 24 April 2001. 
33 European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2010 on public service broadcasting in the digital era: the 
future of the dual system (2010/2028(INI)). 
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procedure (Article 108 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union).34 The 
outcome of the latest proceedings against Germany35 prompted the sixteen state legislatures to 
adopt a revised Interstate Broadcasting Treaty regarding public services broadcasters’ online 
content. As will be discussed later, the state aid procedure with the European Commission has 
had a direct influence on free and independent media in Germany, as it resulted in the 
curtailment of public service broadcasters’ online activities. 
Fourteen independent state media authorities are vested with the power, based on 
statutory law, to assess private broadcasters’ licence procedures and programme 
performance.36 Concurrently, they stimulate media policy developments by fostering private 
broadcasters. In this double function, the state media authorities seek to ensure the democratic 
function of private broadcasters, as the debate on programme requirements for news bulletins 
evidences.37 Simultaneously, they seek to ensure viable market conditions for private 
broadcasters that might curb public service broadcasters’ services. For a democratic 
discourse, free and independent media requires a plurality of different opinions. Regarding 
private operators, German media law seeks to guarantee a plurality of opinions mainly 
through an external pluralism model, the theory being that a diverse range of outlets shall 
ensure a diverse range of opinions. Media concentration is thus regarded as a threat to such an 
unbiased basis for forming opinions and as such a pre-emptive merger control system is 
applied. The Commission on Concentration in the Media implements the applicable law and 
deals with concentration developments in Germany by examining what operator draws what 
percentage of viewers. Concurrently, it assumes an important position within the frame of 
national media concentration supervision.38 
State legislation provides the basic rules for the governing bodies of the public service 
broadcaster stations to ensure free and independent programmes with internal control 
mechanisms. Briefly, the Director General of a public service broadcaster will decide with his 
or her staff what programmes to produce and what issues to address. As broadcasting stations 
employ in some cases several thousand employees, the task of selection is divided among 
departments and editorial offices. The Broadcasting Council supervises the programme 
principles as laid down in the law ex post and elects the Director General. As the principle of 
programme autonomy gives the Director General a great margin of discretion, the 
Broadcasting Council cannot request that a certain programme be aired or a certain issue 
addressed. It can, however, criticise a programme aired ex post and request the Director 
General not to repeat it, if the broadcast violates statutory law or the programming principles. 
As the legislation insulates the public service broadcasters from direct state influence, the 
composition of the Broadcasting and Administrative Councils are important and will be 
discussed later in this report. 
The German Press Council works as a purely self-regulatory institution following the 
tradition of press councils (Desgranges and Wassink, 2005: 79). It was established in 1956 to 
prevent the legislature from establishing a statutory control mechanism. Publishers and 
journalist associations had feared the installation of control organs under the auspices of the 
state (Weyand, 2011: 125). The Press Council’s existence is thus intended to curb state 
influence. According to the Statute of the Council, its main objectives are ensuring the 
                                                 
34 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, OJ of the EU of 9 May 2008, no. C 115, p. 47. 
35 European Commission, State aid E 3/2005, Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, C (2007) 
1761, 24 April 2007. 
36 Art. 36 para. 2 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
37 Direktorenkonferenz der Landesmedienanstalten (DLM), Nachrichtensendungen im privaten Rundfunk. Ein 
Positionspapier, Stuttgart 2010. 
38 See only the report about broadcasting and Internet offers under the view of cross-media concentration: 
Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich, 2010: 41f. 
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freedom of press (online and printed)39 and maintaining the press’ good reputation.40 Media 
policy lobbying and a complaint procedure are the main tools it employs to attain these 
objectives. As for media policy, the Press Council has espoused a bill on press freedom and 
the protection of informants. This is currently being debated in the Federal Parliament.41 The 
complaint procedure was installed in order to ensure a high quality of journalism and an 
accountable press. However, the system has experienced some pressure after successful 
complaints. The Press Council faced a fiercely led and unprecedented campaign by the 
influential tabloid Bild, published by Axel Springer Verlag, questioning the core of the self-
control mechanism. This illustrates the sometimes-charged relationship of the Press Council 
with the press. In this case, the Press Council issued a complaint against the publisher of the 
Bild because the paper violated, in the view of the Press Council, the rights of a defendant in a 
criminal court proceeding by publishing his photo before the court’s verdict was issued.42 
After this, the paper openly campaigned against the Press Council and urged its readers to 
email or call to ‘(…) tell the Press Council their opinion.’43 This led to large number of very 
dismissive, and some supportive, commentaries left with the Press Council’s staff.44 It is 
difficult to deduce from this one incident whether it demonstrates overall disrespect on the 
part of Bild for the complaint system generally. However, it is an alarming sign.  
Another potent group of actors are the private publishers and private broadcasting 
operators, all of which are organised in different associations.45 Although the idea of free and 
independent media’s necessity in a democracy is prevalent, the core of these associations’ 
works is based on economic interests and the need to generate income. For example, the 
Association of Private Broadcasters and Telemedia Operators (VPRT) initiated the state aid 
procedure with the European Commission to gain a better market position by questioning the 
ability of public service broadcasters to offer online content.46 
Finally, private lobby organisations or scientific think tanks as well as the Internet 
community form part of the network of media policy actors, although with diverse interests. 
Although the notion of the Internet community can be elusive, we have employed the term 
here to describe the phenomenon of citizens organising themselves via the Internet to launch 
political actions supporting access to and usage of free and independent media. This is 
exemplified in the case of the partly successful constitutional complaint against federal 
legislation on data retention47 and in the political lobbying against legislation that provided 
for the Internet to be scanned in order to block content with alleged child pornography, rather 
than seeking the deletion of such content from the server in question. With regard to the latter 
issue, it seems that the protests of the Internet community motivated the Federal Government 
and the Federal Parliament to withdraw the legislation in question and to maintain the practice 
of deleting such content.48  
                                                 
39 Art. 10 para. 1 Press Council Statute. 
40 Art. 1 Press Council Statute. 
41 German Press Council, Presserat fordert: Pressefreiheitsgesetz endlich verabschieden, press release of 17 
October 2010. 
42 German Press Council, Entscheidung in der Beschwerdesache 0103/11/2-BA of 9 June 2011. 
43 German Press Council, Press Release of 8 August 2011, Hintergründe zum Bild-Aufruf vom 2.8.11 
[Background information regarding the BILD-call of 2 August 2011]. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (BDZV); Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger (VDZ); 
Verband privater Rundfunk- und Telemedien (VPRT); Arbeitsgemeinschaft Privater Rundfunk (APR). 
46 European Commission, State aid E 3/2005, Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, C (2007) 
1761, 24 April 2007, para. 70. 
47 Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 2 March 2010, no. 1 BvR 256/08, NJW 2010, p. 833. 
48 Bundesregierung, Bundesministerium der Justiz, Digitale Welt – Absage an Netzsperren wichtiger Schritt in 
der Netzpolitik, Press Release of 25 May 2011. 
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3. The structure of the media market 
 
3.1 Basic observations 
The existing German media market structure can be seen as a result of historical events and 
political negotiating processes among the actors or groups of actors described above. In cases 
in which no political common denominator could be found, court decisions have paved the 
way. Finally, technical inventions and developments shaping the market have been either 
fostered politically or legally or, conversely, have emerged in a legal or political vacuum and 
compelled legislatures, where it was deemed necessary, to act. The distinct phases were, non-
exhaustively, as follows: when the Allied Forces after World War II introduced the idea of 
federal public service broadcasting, they simultaneously licensed private publishers to produce 
newspapers. Those two actors, public service broadcasters and private publishers, are still very 
much involved in the formulation of rules regarding the media market. Private broadcasters 
entered the field during the deregulation area in the 1980s, starting with cable and satellite 
services. The Federal Government continued with the deregulation processes and relaxed its 
regulation of the telecommunications market. The former monopolists Deutsche Bundespost 
(now Deutsche Telekom AG) faced private competition as the entry of new operators was 
made possible, although it remains the strongest company in terms of revenue and employees. 
As the telecommunications infrastructure has become the technical backbone of today’s 
Internet, its market configuration merits attention. As well as Deutsche Telekom AG, many 
private Internet access providers have allowed the Internet, with its different services, to join 
the traditional press, radio, and broadcasting as the fourth and still growing media form in the 
market. Moreover, new journalistic services have emerged based solely on online content and 
have created genuinely new forms of media, such as online newspapers and political blogs.49 
In addition, traditional media have started to use the Internet, either by creating their own 
websites to transport content published or broadcast already, or, more often, to provide new 
forms of online content using the varied features of devices such as tablet computers or smart 
phones. As well as these basic types of information outlets, hybrid or mixed forms exist, such 
as the news pages of Internet or email providers or the news aggregation services from various 
search engines. With the new forms of transmission available via the Internet to portable 
devices, new market models, such as apps, and new global players, such as search engines, 
have entered the market.  
At the time Internet-based services became important as mass media services, the 
existing political structure of media policymaking and the legal structure of the media market 
had already been settled. This means that a completely new technical means of mass 
transmission, including the possibility to create and impart content, along with the emergence 
of new actors, hit the legal and political structure of media policymaking developed over the 
decades and changed the playing field for actors involved in the formulation of policy. Internet 
based media services began to compel the legislatures to revise and reformulate existing media 
law. As a result, the basic structure of rules regulating the media market still exists, but it has 
been partly adapted to the new market situation. However, the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty 
must still be revised against the background of digital convergence.50 
 
                                                 
49 Examples are: http://www.buergerblick.de/; http://www.kontextwochenzeitung.de/; 
http://www.nachdenkseiten.de/. 
50 Proposals have addressed the Internet outlets of all traditional media and have come to different results. See 
Papier and Schröder, 2010: 3; Gersdorf, 2010: 421ff. 
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3.2 The advent of the Internet based services and their influence on political and legal 
debates 
The advent of the Internet prompted the discussion as to whether media law needed to be 
overhauled and whether the Basic Law and its interpretation of the Federal Constitutional 
Court should be revised (Holznagel, 2011; Papier and Schröder, 2010; Hachmeister and 
Vesting, 2011: 7-8; Bullinger, 2009: paras. 146-150). The technical convergence explains the 
current considerations. In terms of form, the online websites of traditional press products do 
not necessarily differ much from the online websites maintained by public service 
broadcasters. Even though broadcasters offer on demand videos of their broadcasts, like series 
or documentaries, which are not part of press online platforms, both - print media and 
broadcasters - offer texts and short on demand clips. The former distinct line between print 
media and broadcasting has blurred. Not surprisingly, the interpretation of the freedom of 
print media and broadcasting in the Basic Law and its implementation in federal or state 
media law currently faces criticism based on the argument that in times of platform and 
content convergence it is not possible to differentiate between print and broadcasting media 
(Ory, 2011; Schmid and Kitz, 2009). 
 Thus, the question of how to interpret legally core legal terms is prevailing and 
important for media policy, as it touches upon the basic structure of the whole media system 
in Germany. It has to be reiterated that the media landscape, especially the dual broadcasting 
system, relies on the idea that the legislature is responsible for ensuring a free and 
independent public communicative space for democratic discourse, as drawn from Article 5 
of the Basic Law. If there were a fundamental change in this legally underpinned 
understanding of the media structure, i.e. the dual system and the role of the public service 
broadcaster, this would alter the basic structure, as the constitutional foundation for all public 
service broadcasters would fall away.  
Two aspects merit attention in this regard: firstly, the interpretation of Article 5 of the 
Basic Law regarding a regulated public communicative space and, secondly, the legal 
distinction of broadcasting, print media and Internet based services, or ‘telemedia’, and thus 
the legal notion of broadcasting in statutory law. Both questions have very practical 
repercussions for private and public service broadcasters, print media and online media 
services at large, and thus strong political and economic interests are interrelated. 
The first aspect, the interpretation of the Basic Law, refers especially to the obligation 
of the legislature to establish independent and free broadcasting for a public space of 
communication to exchange ideas and opinions independently and freely. The legislature 
decided to establish a public service broadcasting system to fulfil this requirement, but as the 
ways in which mass communication - relevant for democratic decisions - is carried out 
change, this in turn affects the broadcasting system. The function of the mass media in a 
democracy is to ensure and guarantee free and independent media by, among other things, 
providing the necessary content relevant for political debates, cultural exchange and societal 
development. If the assessment of media behaviour by consumers concludes that Internet 
services partly replace traditional broadcasting, state legislatures are obliged to provide the 
necessary legal framework to provide audiovisual media services, including traditional and 
new online media services, as part of public service broadcasting’s role in fulfilling societal 
requirements (Vollmeier, 2004: 198-199; Hain and Reinlein, 2009: 61-64).51 The study ‘The 
salience of the Internet within the frame of protection of media plurality’ shows on the basis 
of existing data that the journalistic and editorial provisions of traditional media outlets are 
predominant in the online media market (Neuberger and Lobigs, 2010: 37). People using 
certain offline outlets tend to receive information from the corresponding online outlet. Thus 
                                                 
51 A more critical stance is articulated by Ory, 2010: 23-24. 
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plurality of opinion shaping in the Internet does not occur automatically (Kommission zur 
Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich, 2010: 43). Furthermore, technical 
convergence does not mean functional convergence, as different media outlets fulfil distinct 
functions while using the same platform, such as illustrated in the way various services are 
accessed via tablet computers or other technical means. The former judge of the Federal 
Constitutional Court D. Grimm said: ‘Convergence of devices does not amount to a 
convergence of function and media content.’52 For example, the editorial online press has also 
a whole other dimension besides the fact that it can be read online, simply because it is made 
in the tradition of a print media outlet with its editorial background and its political 
orientation.  
The technical development of convergence also affects the legal distinction between 
broadcasting and print media. As the German media law concerning online provisions or 
Internet services is still shaped by the traditional distinction of a liberal print media law on 
one side and much more regulated public and private broadcasting on the other, the ideas 
circle around the question how to integrate the technical developments within national media 
law (Hachmeister and Vesting, 2011: 7; Bullinger, 2007; Möllers, 2008; Holznagel, 2011; 
Papier and Schröder, 2010). The legislature foreclosed, for example, online content from 
public service broadcasters which are comparable to print media services and not linked to 
any programme, which appears to leave the courts with the difficult task of implementing the 
vague notion of press comparability. The legal action of newspaper publishers53 against the 
tagesschau.de app, which is software for presenting the online content of the public service 
broadcasters’ working coalition ARD, illustrates the difficult and sometimes very competitive 
situation among media operators. A coalition of private publishers, among them influential 
heavyweights such Axel Springer AG and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH, claim 
that the version of the website infringes the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty.54 The Interstate 
Broadcasting Treaty prohibits public service broadcasters from offering ‘press comparable 
content’. The publishers assert that the tagesschau.de app does contain such content.55 As the 
private publishers, private broadcasters as well as public service broadcasters come to 
perceive the Internet as the technical means to transmit news online content, partly in addition 
to their traditional services, this opinion fuels the heated media policy debate on how to 
formulate and interpret the legal framework. 
The law illustrates the difficulties the legislature faces in order to define legally new 
online services and raises the question as to whether it should place more awareness in this 
subject as it concerns the future of opinion forming processes. On a European level, the 
European Union came to the conclusion that technical developments regarding broadcasting 
and the Internet needed to be addressed and thus prepared in 2002/2003 a new legislative 
procedure (Holtz-Bacha, 2006: 130).56 The resultant legislation replaced the term 
‘broadcasting’ with ‘audiovisual media services’ to find a new definition for the online 
environment and so anticipated the manifestation of new media services.57 However, the 
German discussion does not only concern the notion of broadcasting and ‘telemedia’, but also 
reflects the dispute over the role of the public service broadcaster in the online environment. 
                                                 
52 Interview of 23 August 2011. 
53 Press release of Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, BDZV: Klage gegen Tagesschau-App of June 
21, 2011. 
54 BDZV, press release of 21 June 2011, BDZV: Klage gegen Tagesschau-App. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Commission of the European Communities, Fourth Report (…) on the application of Directive 89/552/ECC 
“Television without Frontiers”, COM(2002)778 final of 6 January 2003. 
57 Directive 2007/65/EC, OJ L 332 of 18 December 2007; amended by Directive 2010/13/EU, OJ L 95 of 15 
April 2010. 
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3.3 Concentration and competition law: the legal framework of the private press, private 
broadcasting, and new Internet services with regard to media pluralism 
Media pluralism is one core characteristic of a modern media landscape in a democratic 
society. The concept of media pluralism espouses the idea that diverse media outlets present 
the different opinions necessary for societal discourse. This applies especially in such 
circumstances in which no internal media pluralism statutes or a practice or culture of internal 
pluralism (i.e. within editorial offices) exist. A plurality of media outlets basically allows the 
flow of different opinions freely. Although external pluralism can provide plurality of opinion, 
this is not always the case. While the audience in Germany can receive more than 300 
television channels, this does not automatically guarantee a plurality in opinion. Thus, 
structural regulation aiming at broad content offerings in terms of the number of outlets is a 
prerequisite for free and independent media in which public discourse can flourish. The 
question as to whether media policy achieves this objective has to be seen together with the 
issue of content regulation. This will be addressed in the following section. 
Different ways exist to engender media pluralism and, as stated earlier, in the German 
case a dual system of regulated public service and a market orientated private press, private 
online services and private broadcasting exist. Here the question shall be addressed as to 
whether and how market rules and the accompanying competition and concentration 
legislation sufficiently fulfil the task of providing the framework conditions for a diverse 
media landscape.  
State actors at both levels generally seek, as a primary objective, the external plurality 
of media outlets. This is evidenced in the legislation relating to print media from all sixteen 
federal states, none of which requires licence procedures. Although in the 1950s the Allied 
Forces obliged publishers to apply for licences, this constraint was soon abandoned. Premised 
on the Basic Law, which guarantees a free press, no licence procedure has been implemented 
or seriously discussed. As media policy relies on the market promoting a diverse mix of media 
outlets, intellectual property law (as online content can easily be copied),58 the Act against 
Unfair Competition59 and the Act against Competition Constraints60 have all gained practical 
importance. In large cities, which exhibit a highly contested market situation as several 
newspapers compete for the same circle of readers, legal departments in publishing companies 
spend a lot of time analysing, for example, competitor’s advertising campaigns solely to find 
possible infringements of the Act against Unfair Competition.61 This especially includes 
looking at price reductions for newspaper subscriptions or other enticements. The Act against 
Competition Constraints pursues a more systemic approach as it entitles the Federal Cartel 
Authority to scrutinise merger applications from publishing companies.62 Drawing on the 
publishers’ annual turnover as the basis for its decisions, the Federal Cartel Authority can 
prohibit a merger if the acquisition would lead to a market dominant position. The Federal 
Parliament adopted a press merger control mechanism based on the criterion of economic 
significance in 1976. This was accompanied with heated political debates. Proponents of the 
merger control generally asserted the need to uphold a plurality of opinions in the print media 
market while opponents saw the state as unjustifiably intervening in the freedom of the press 
(Hofmann, 2010: 46-49). The actors in the debate found a political common denominator in 
the merger control in cartel law, although its efficiency in promoting and engendering plurality 
                                                 
58 Act on Copyright Law and Comparable Protection Rights [Gesetz über die Urheberrechte und verwandte 
Schutzrechte (UrhG), 2008]. 
59 Act against Unfair Competition [Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), 2010]. 
60 Act against Competition Constraints [Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB), 2011]. 
61 See Art. 4 no. 4 and no. 5 Act against Unfair Competition. 
62 See Art. 35 para. 2 and Art. 38 para. 3 Act against Competition Contraints. See also Gounalakis and Zagouras, 
2008. 
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of opinions in print media is contested (Hofmann, 2010: 49-67; Gounalakis and Zagouras, 
2008: 68). Any other model such as subsidies for small publishing houses or a control system 
based on opinion domination, however, would require a political majority that seems rather 
unlikely to be attained (Gounalakis and Zagouras, Medienkonzentrationsrecht, 2008: 66). This 
purely economic approach of the state media policy towards the current press market 
exacerbates the situation of some regional and local print outlets. The cartel law presumes a 
free market will provide the financial means for the market actors and tries to ensure 
competitive market conditions. It does not, however, provide any tools if market conditions 
lead to financial constraints besides market dominance. In fact, as the number of publications 
decline, the concentration of editorial staff increases (also known as editorial units), and the 
existence of some regional newspapers is threatened simply due to lack of subscriptions and 
advertising revenue.  
Private broadcasting shows a very different picture. Broadcasting law provides for 
much stricter rules regarding mergers. Politically contested due to its potential impact, the law 
entitles the Commission on the Concentration in the Media (hereafter Commission) to gauge 
the percentage of viewers for nationwide private broadcasting channels and their influence on 
media related markets. Furthermore, on the level of the federal states, the legislatures adopted 
cross media concentration provisions to address local or regional private broadcasting and 
press conglomerates, applying different requirements.63 Regarding nationwide channels, the 
Commission can prohibit a merger if the acquisition will lead to a dominant mass 
communication position. The law aims to prevent opinion dominance and thus vests the 
Commission with the power to assess market share. This applies also in cross-ownership 
acquisitions involving broadcasting and other media outlets, including print media and online 
services. In such cases the Commission takes the convergent market situation, i.e. market 
share, into account. In any licensing procedure of a nationwide broadcaster, the Commission 
must be involved and give its consent to the license. The same accounts for changes in 
ownership structures.64 It was this that led to the Commission prohibiting the acquisition of 
private broadcaster Prosieben.Sat1 Media AG by publisher Axel Springer AG. It concluded the 
merger would lead to a dominant market position and thus a dominant position concerning 
pluralism of opinion.65 As a result, the Commission impeded the largest merger of two media 
companies in German history. It was heavily criticised for this decision. The composition of 
the Commission itself also came under criticism. Until then, the Commission had been made 
up of a board of media experts. The state governments went on to review and finally alter this 
composition,66 leading to the current situation in which half the Commission’s members are 
media experts and half are representatives (generally the directors) of the state media 
authorities. Although the new composition does not have necessarily undue influence on future 
proceedings, it is asserted that the participation of state media authorities might mitigate the so 
far strict implementation of concentration regulations.67 
The latter incident illustrates the pressure by state governments, presumably instigated, 
or at least espoused by, private broadcasters and publishers. Another media policy event 
relating to the legislation on merger concentration procedures displays the influence of 
economic interests on the legislative process. With the amendment of 1996, the law provides 
                                                 
63 See Art. 33a) State Media Law North-Rhine Westphalia [Landesmediengesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2009] 
and Art. 19 Interstate Treaty on Media Law in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein [Staatsvertrag über das 
Medienrecht in Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein, 2011]. For a critical appraisal on state media concentration 
see: Holznagel, 2010: 261-262. 
64 Art. 29 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
65 KEK, decision of 10 January 2006, no. KEK 293-1 bis 5. 
66 See for the repercussions of the decision: Westphal, 2008. 
67 See critical appraisals of the newly composed Commission on Concentration in the Media: Gounalakis and 
Zagouras, 2008: 212. 
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in Article 26 of the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty for the ceiling of 30% market share in 
viewers.68 This was a highly disputed compromise among political actors during its 
negotiation. Basically, it spared the two largest private operators, the RTL-Group and then 
Kirch-Group (now ProSiebenSat1.Media AG), from adapting to the concentration law and 
gave them an additional space to grow (Hartstein, et al., 2011: para. 1). 
Besides the Commission, the Federal Cartel Authority - focusing on market 
dominance - controls whether an intended merger complies with the Act against Restraints of 
Competition. The Act requires the Federal Cartel Authority to scrutinise mergers of 
broadcasters and publishers. It focuses only on the economic market situation and not the 
possible dominant position regarding opinion forming (Gounalakis and Zagouras, 2008: 198). 
The Federal Cartel Authority also dismissed the merger application mentioned above,69 
triggering broad discussions. The Federal Court of Justice ultimately had to rule on the case 
and upheld the decision of the Federal Cartel Authority.70 The Federal Cartel Authority can 
also easily act on issues relating to online content, as it is not restricted in its remit to any 
means of transmission or to broadcasting. In March 2011 it prohibited the plan for a joint 
company made up of ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG and RTL interactive GmbH, a subsidiary of 
RTL Germany.71 The companies had intended to enter the market with a joint platform 
providing video on demand. 
 
3.4 The legal concept of public service broadcasters: state legislation creating free and 
independent media 
What might sound paradoxical can engender a communicative space. Free and independent 
media can be the result of state legislation. As the Federal Constitutional Court pointed out 
regarding broadcasting, the Basic Law obliges the state to create a legal framework72 in which 
free and independent broadcasting can flourish. That means broadcasting must be free from 
undue influence from the state or any other group and must be endowed with the necessary 
financial resources to provide sufficient channels and programmes. ‘The legislator has to 
adopt in particular regulations which make sure broadcasting is not at the mercy of one or 
single groups, relevant social forces get a chance to speak and freedom of reporting remains 
untouched.’73 These requirements of the Federal Constitutional Court clearly pronounce the 
basic idea of mass communication as serving free and independent opinion shaping in a 
democratic society.74 The Court left it to the state legislatures and governments to decide what 
legal form can fulfil the requirements it laid down. Historical reasons led to public service 
broadcasting. State legislatures established the legal framework for the running of the 
broadcasting stations as well as an independent procedure to discern the stations’ financial 
needs, which is administered by the Commission for the Evaluation of Fiscal Needs. 
The Federal Constitutional Court gave special attention to the issue of undue state 
influence on public service broadcasting, due to the potential threat it poses. The current 
legislation seeks to address this based on three principles: Firstly, public service broadcasting 
has to be free from the state. Secondly, it has to be independent organisationally. In simple 
terms, this means state representatives must not be in a position to govern broadcasting 
stations. Thirdly, the Director General of each broadcasting station must independently 
                                                 
68 Dritter Rundfunkänderungsstaatsvertrag, GV.NRW of 13 December 1996, p. 484. 
69 Bundeskartellamt, decision of 19 January 2006, no. B 6 - 92202 - Fa - 103/05. 
70 Federal Court of Justice, decision of 6 June 2010, no. KVR 4/09, MMR 2011, p. 60. 
71 Bundeskartellamt, decision of 17 March 2011, no. B 6 – 94/10. 
72 BVerfGE 57, 295, at p. 321. 
73 BVerfGE 57, 295, at p. 322, unofficial translation. 
74 See also BVerfGE 57, 295, at p. 319-320. 
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undertake programme planning. The broadcasting stations thus have discretionary power to 
decide premised on editorial principles what programmes shall be aired and made available 
online.75 The composition of the governing bodies, the Broadcasting Councils and the 
Administrative Councils, are to ensure the broadcasting station’s supervision system functions 
independently without overwhelming influence from one societal group. As a basic principle 
(also provided in the applicable legal acts), the Broadcasting Council’s task is to represent the 
interests of society at large in taking into account all the different opinions of citizens living in 
Germany.76 The legislature seeks to implement this principle by placing representative 
societal groups on the Councils, such as representatives of unions, churches, sports or science 
associations and cultural groups. Representatives of political parties are also admitted. While 
surely part of society, political parties also have a clear affiliation towards state 
representatives such as members of the state governments. Not uncommonly, some laws also 
provide that the state government is entitled to delegate a representative to the Council.  
Although the state legislation always provides for a majority of the representatives of 
societal groups, state or political party influence in Broadcasting Councils cannot be denied. 
Even if it is difficult to denote, studies report a partisan discussion culture between 
conservatives and social democrats on Broadcasting Councils (Hahn, 2010: 162). 
Furthermore, representatives of governments’ political parties are reported to consider their 
role in the Broadcasting Council as members of the party and thus espouse party positions 
instead of, as mentioned, the different opinions of society as a whole. This systemic deficit 
can, of course, be rectified in different ways. While state representatives or single members of 
the Broadcasting Council might seek to influence the whole Broadcasting Council, the 
composition with different groups and various societal representatives can thwart their 
domination. In addition, the number of party representatives can be minimised, as it was done 
in the case of the Interstate Treaty on Northern German Broadcasting. This interstate treaty 
stipulates that less than 20 per cent of the Broadcasting Council’s members can be party 
representatives and none of them governmental. Other stations display other compositions. In 
the Television Council of the Second German Television, for example, representatives of 
political parties, governments and city representatives amount to more than 40 per cent of all 
Council members.77 In the case of the Second German Television, undue state influence 
occurred in a case in which the Administrative Council denied its consent regarding a senior 
editorial position for political reasons. As a corollary, the state government of Rhineland-
Palatinate lodged a constitutional application with the Federal Constitutional Court asking the 
Court to decide on the composition and number of state representatives in the public service 
broadcasting governing bodies premised on the principle of independence from the state. 
Economic interests pull at the public service broadcasters’ legal framework as well. 
The state aid procedure with the European Commission illustrates how public service 
broadcasters’ online activities relate to commercial online content and how European actors 
have gained influence in what was once a solely national debate. The influence of the 
European Commission on the state legislatures is important, as public service broadcasters are 
created by state law, implying that the activities of public service broadcasters can also be 
curtailed by state legislatures. 
In 2005, a conglomerate of the Association of Private Broadcasters and Telemedia 
Operators (VPRT) and other private operators lodged a state aid complaint with the European 
                                                 
75 See Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 6 October 1992, no. 1 BvR 1586/89, NJW 1992, p. 3285. 
76 See only Art. 16 para. 1 West-German-Broadcasting Act [Gesetz über den Westdeutschen Rundfunk Köln, 
2011]. 
77 Art. 21 para. 1 Interstate Treaty on Second German Television. 
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Commission against the public service broadcasters’ financial licence system.78 The private 
broadcasters essentially criticised what they described as the ‘(…) allegedly uncontrolled 
expansion of public service broadcasters into new media services (…).’79 The European 
Commission decided that ‘(…) to make sure that the determination of whether new media 
activities satisfy the same democratic, social and cultural needs of society is based on a set of 
criteria suitable to assess the public service character of the service in question also in light of 
other already available offers on the market,’80 which resulted in new legislation for public 
service broadcasters and a demanding procedure for the Broadcasting Councils.81 The public 
service broadcasters withdrew some online content, installed a time-differentiated data 
retention system (ranging from seven days to several years or unlimited,82 as prescribed in the 
law83) and underwent a time consuming and costly three-step test with all online content and 
all broadcasting stations in which the governing bodies, the Broadcasting Councils and 
Television Council had to affirm the public service broadcasters’ online services. 
Furthermore, the legislature adopted a ‘negative list’ for public service broadcaster online 
content to exclude the public service broadcaster from commercially viable offers and any 
advertising on the public service broadcasters’ websites.84 
The economically driven complaint by the private broadcasters found with the 
European Commission’s state aid directorate an economically orientated organ to decide on 
the issue. Admittedly, state aid procedures are legitimately based on economic concerns. 
However, media services in modern democracies hold cultural and democratic as well as 
economic dimensions.85 The ambiguous wording of Protocol (No 29) on the System of Public 
Service Broadcasting86 sought to balance the different interests involved: the member states 
retained the competence to finance public service broadcasting and define their remit as long 
as the funding does not affect competition ‘(…) contrary to the common interest, while the 
realisation of the remit of that public service shall be taken into account.’87 While balancing 
the respective interests of private and public service broadcasters is an important feature of 
media policy, the following problem occurs when this task is relinquished to the state aid 
review procedure: the procedure can be repeated any time, as the case is not final in the sense 
that judgments are, and the state aid procedure is premised on an economic framework of 
understanding, which does not necessarily take into account the media’s important cultural 
and thus democratic aspects. As a result, the European Commission’s state aid procedure 
exerts a far-reaching and decisive influence on the member state’s public service 
broadcasting’s core elements: the financing regimes and remits. Despite recurring criticism 
from private broadcasters and publishers,88 the implementation through the Broadcasting 
Council’s three-step procedure is generally accepted. Currently no political debate exists to 
alter the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty in this regard. Even if it seems unlikely that the 
publishers and private broadcasters will mount another state aid complaint with the European 
                                                 
78 European Commission, State aid E 3/2005, Financing of public service broadcasters in Germany, C (2007) 
1761, 24 April 2007, para. 70. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., para. 310. 
81 Art. 11f Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. See also: Nawrath, 2011; Peters, 26. 
82 See as an example, WDR, Telemedienkonzept für das Internetangebot des WDR. Vorlage zur 519. Sitzung des 
WDR Rundfunkrats am 18. Juni 2010, p. 18. 
83 Art. 11d para. 2 no. 1-4 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
84 Annex to Art. 11d para. 5 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty: Negative List of Public Broadcasting Telemedia. 
85 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to 
public service broadcasting, OJ C 320 of 15 November 2001, paras. 5-6. 
86 OJ of the European Union, C 115/312 of 9 May 2008. 
87 Ibid. 
88 VDZ, Absage an ein ausbalanciertes, faires System, press release of 24 June 2010; VPRT, VPRT legt 
Stellungnahme zu Drei-Stufen-Testverfahren vor. http://www.vprt.de/verband/presse/pressemitteilungen/ 
content/vprt-legt-stellungnahmen-zu-drei-stufen-testverfahren-und-, accessed 21 October 2011. 
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Commission, the case remains essentially unsolved. The legal framework, however, has 
changed since the last complaint, as Article 11 of the European Union Fundamental Rights 
Charter is now applicable and has to be taken into account if the decisions of the Commission 
were to be challenged before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Although 
current discussions do not display any signs that the actors are likely to initiate another state 
aid procedure with the resultant possibility of a claim before the CJEU, it remains a 
possibility. As such, the CJEU could become another decisive player in media policy. 
 
3.5 State media authorities’ role in promoting free and independent media 
The legal framework of private broadcasters exhibits a different structural composition to that 
relating to public service broadcasters. This is due to the distinct concept of private 
broadcasting which places the private entrepreneur in the centre of actors regulated by the 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty and state media laws. The law provides basic provisions 
differentiating between regional and nationwide broadcasting, radio, television and online 
content, and allowing private actors to start airing once licensing procedures (if necessary) are 
concluded. 
Fourteen state media authorities and their joint governing bodies supported by several 
co-regulatory bodies (for example regarding youth protection) supervise private broadcasting. 
What are the concrete measures for private broadcasting affecting free and independent 
media? Except for private Internet radio, all private broadcasters are obliged by law to submit 
an application with the responsible state media authority to obtain a licence. During the 
application procedure, the state media authorities assess, among other things, whether the 
applicant can guarantee it is qualified in terms of financial backing and has a sufficient 
programme plan to organise broadcasting.89 Furthermore, and unlike print media, legal 
entities of public law, such as Federal Ministries or single state governments, are not entitled 
to apply for a licence.90 390 private television (full-coverage, thematic and regional) channels 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 49) and 252 private radio 
(nationwide and regional) channels (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 
163) indicate that licensing procedures do not impede unduly free media. 
The ex post programme supervision mechanisms91 of the state media authorities and 
their joint-body, the Commission on Licensing and Supervision (ZAK), as well as the 
Commission for the Protection of Minors in the Media (KJM) fulfil an important task within 
the private broadcasting’s field of action. Even though programme supervision concerns 
media content, the structural composition of the state media authorities seems to have 
influenced their supervisory practice. As such, this is of importance for this report’s focus on 
the societal and democratic function of free and independent media. The factors behind the 
structural composition are the developments during private broadcasting’s inception. During 
the 1980s, the formative period of private broadcasting in the federal states, state governments 
sought to convince broadcasting companies to establish their company seat in the represented 
state for two reasons: to gain influence over the private broadcaster and to allocate work 
opportunities. The developments in the private broadcasting market were complemented with 
state supervision organs, the state media authorities, which then had acted as lawful 
supervisory organs as well as lobby organs for private broadcasters.92 Single state media 
                                                 
89 Art. 20a para. 1 no. 6 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
90 Art. 20a para. 3 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
91 See the activities in 2010 on programme complaints and supervision measures: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 37-39. 
92 That is for instance the case in the procedure for allocating wireless transmission capacities: Article 51 para. 3 
no. 3 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
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authorities were responsible for the private broadcaster’s supervision, depending where the 
station was located. Thus, private broadcasters had been able to establish their seat in the state 
with presumed advantages including a recalcitrant supervision.93 
The question arises as to whether state media authorities gave precedence to lawful 
supervision (including fines) or to the economic interests of the private broadcasters, as state 
media authorities also seek to engender viable market conditions. The interests of viable 
programme options are likely to have influenced the developments in the field of, for 
instance, gambling-related television programmes. Call-in game shows exemplify this, as 
channels were granted airtime for gambling formats to yield income for other content,94 
although transparency requirements for viewers were questioned (Wimmer, 2007). In other 
fields, the state media authorities acted reluctantly to impose fines or complaints regarding 
less distinct programme requirements such as personal rights founded on the protection of 
human dignity,95 although awareness exists of possible negative impacts.96 It can, however, 
not be ascertained if the reasons are to be sought in the vague legislation or the purported 
disadvantages for private broadcasters.  
The state legislatures changed the federal approach of lawful supervision by single 
state media authorities profoundly in 2008 by introducing an overall body, the ZAK, 
responsible for all nationwide broadcasting in order to unify the supervisory practice, reduce 
competition among state media authorities and presumably to prevent single interest 
decisions.97 Furthermore, debates about the legal framework for gambling-related television 
programmes led in 2008 and 2009 to new regulations that introduced stricter transparency 
regulations,98 followed by supervisory measures from the ZAK (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 38). The newly stricter transparency rules reduced the 
revenues yielded, leading some broadcasters to dispense with the programmes.  
 
3.6 Conclusion: structural media policy for free and independent media 
The German media policy landscape has undergone a deep change as broadcasting (terrestrial 
and online), for example, is now subject to policy negotiation and regulation not only by the 
state governments, but also by the Internet community, the federal state and the European 
Union (Gerlach, 2011a: 118ff.; Gerlach, 2011b). These latest developments prompted the 
discussion as to how the German media policy should evolve (Gerlach, 2011a: 286ff.). It 
seems necessary, though, to see media policy more as a multi-level mechanism in which the 
actors from the Internet community, state and federal legislatures, the judiciary as well as 
European bodies, i.e. the European Union and the Council of Europe, have to be taken into 
account to present and instigate a comprehensive and accepted media legislation.99  
German media legislation and implementation used to be differentiated according to 
the legal competences of the individual states and the federal state. State governments 
organised themselves in the state media commission, in which relevant legislation pertaining 
to broadcasting was (and still is) debated, bargained and prepared by few state government 
                                                 
93 This issue is addressed in the parliamentary debate about the new legislation introducing the ZAK. See 
Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen, Plenarprotokoll 14/88 of 17 April 2008, p. 10465. 
94 Bayerische Landeszentrale für Neue Medien, press release of 22 March 2007, no 13. 
95 Landesanstalt für Medien Nordrhein-Westfalen, “Menschenwürde im privaten Rundfunk”: Mahrenholz 
ermutigt Medienaufsicht zu beherztem Vorgehen, press release of 3 February 2010. 
96 A self critical appraisal is offered by Schneider, 2011. A differentiated legal analysis is provided by Klass, 
2011: 52, 125-127. 
97 10. Rundfunkänderungsstaatsvertrag, GV.NRW of 15 July 2008. 
98 Satzung der Landesmedienanstalten über Gewinnspielsendungen und Gewinnspiele of 19 December 2008. 
99 As multi-level governance: Gerlach, 2011a: 111 and 286. 
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chancelleries. The state parliaments enacted the results of the commission’s meetings - the 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty - usually without any decisive complaints. While media 
politicians, the state governments and the Federal Government sought (and still seek) to create 
a sustainable legal structure for media operators, resorting to courts, especially to the Federal 
Constitutional Court, has been in the last decades (and still is) an epitome of German media 
policy.100 At the same time, private operators have sought to establish better market 
conditions, while state and federal legislatures introduced legislation to impede media 
concentration. Concurrently, public service broadcasters sought to retain their position 
regarding their remit and financial independence. With the European Union and its decision-
making mechanisms, the well-known cycle of political disputes and national court 
proceedings was complemented with the CJEU, the state aid procedure of the European 
Commission and the European legislation. The European Commission’s state aid procedure in 
particular proved an efficient lever to shape national media policy.  
In this multi-level policy landscape, the legislature faces the challenge of identifying 
the different and partly competing interests of media operators while establishing and 
maintaining free and independent media in various different political forums. The state aid 
procedure testifies to this, as the basic concept of public service broadcasters and the 
economic interests of private broadcasters and publishers were affected. Furthermore, 
technical developments emerging with the Internet prompt the question of free and 
independent media in relation to an unfettered market or to a differentiated regulation concept 
taking the distinct functions of media outlets necessary to a democracy into account. If the 
state governments and legislatures were to decide to ignore the specific interpretation of the 
Basic Law regarding broadcasting, this would call into question the existing legal premise for 
the whole broadcasting system and open the playing field for an individually free and 
independent, but solely privately structured, communication system. It remains to be decided 
as to whether this will be necessary.101 The Federal Constitutional Court has until now 
followed its own interpretation that Article 5 of the Basic Law obliges the legislature to 
provide the legal framework for a communicative space.102 This implies the inclusion of 
online content from public service broadcasters in a digitally converged media landscape 
(Dörr, 2008: 45).103 
 
 
                                                 
100 The last judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on the license fee for the public service broadcasters 
testifies to this. See Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 11 September 2007, 1 BvR 2270/05, MMR 2007, 
p. 770. After state governments were not able to find a common political denominator for the composition of the 
television and administrative council of the Second German Television (ZDF) regarding state representatives in 
the councils, the government of Rhineland-Palatinate submitted a constitutional action with the FCC. A decision 
is expected in 2012. 
101 See for instance the differentiated legal analysis of Möllers, 2008. 
102 The last decision regarding public service broadcaster was 2007: Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 
11 September 2007, no. 1 BvR 2270/05, MMR 2007, p. 771. 
103 Ibid., p. 772-773 (guarantee of technical development). 
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4. Composition and diversification of media content 
The focus of our examination is on media content that engenders democratic discourse and 
democratic participation. Two basic observations merit attention at this point. The idea of 
democratic discourse is rooted in the concept of democracy in which people discuss matters 
of the state and the intermediaries - print media, the broadcasting and the Internet - facilitate 
or provide the means for the necessary communication. Part of this communication implies 
communication in a public sphere that serves political decision processes by ordering and 
thematically presenting relevant issues (Schicha, 2010: 26). However, this should not lead to 
the conclusion that there exists only one public sphere. Rather, with the advent of private 
broadcasting and now the Internet, many also politically relevant communicative spaces exist 
(Schicha, 2010: 37). Another point refers to the constitutionally protected principle of the 
independence of the media from the state. This basic principle implies the state cannot and 
should not prescribe or influence the content of media outlets. Concurrently, the state has an 
obligation to engender and facilitate the media outlets and thus media content necessary for a 
democracy. It is this which leads the state to protect the media, for example, from undue 
economic influence, as it risks affecting content. Both aspects are important for free and 
independent public opinion-forming. 
  
4.1 Positive measures encouraging the diversification of media content 
 
4.1.1 News coverage in private broadcasting 
Positive legal measures to encourage diversification of programme contents exist in German 
media law, although their wording is relatively vague. Article 2, paragraph 2 no. 3 of the 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty defines for instance the term ‘full coverage programme’ 
applicable for private broadcasting channels. This is an important notion because the licensing 
procedure regime refers to it. It means that a licence for a full coverage channel can only be 
issued and retained if the broadcaster fulfils specific requirements, including a programme 
plan with a diverse content of information, education, advice and entertainment. The law does 
not prescribe a concrete percentage of what diverse content of information means.104 This has 
resulted in different interpretations in the legal literature regarding this requirement 
(Holznagel and Kibele, 2011: paras. 64c-65; Schulz, 2008: para. 63). It is argued, however, 
that - as a bare minimum - 10 per cent of the programmes must be, for instance, information 
(Holznagel and Kibele, 2011: para. 65).105 Furthermore, the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty 
requires that private operators give representation to the diverse and relevant political, 
ideological and societal opinions in the programmes of full coverage channels.106 Those 
prescriptions are rooted in the judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court, in which the 
court clearly stated that private broadcasting programmes do not have to fulfil the same strict 
standards as public service broadcasters, but nevertheless are required to broadcast content 
which serves free and independent public opinion forming.107  
These requirements of the Federal Constitutional Court are important for the 
communicative space in which political relevant information and controversial subjects can 
be addressed. A communicative public space consists of programmes aired and their viewers. 
                                                 
104 This is a result of the constitutional interpretation of the principle of the freedom of state for broadcasting 
programmes. 
105 Although that opens the discussion about the notion of information. Schulz, 2008: paras. 64-65. 
106 Art. 25 para. 1 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
107 Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 4 November 1985, no. 1 BvF 1/84, NJW 1987, p. 241, and 
judgment of 12 March 2008, no. 2 BvF 4/03, MMR 2008, p. 591. 
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Thus, the average percentage of viewers of private broadcasting denotes such a public sphere, 
although only very roughly. Using this as a starting point, the German media landscape 
discloses a clear deficit in the programmes of the two large private broadcasters, 
ProSieben.Sat1 Media AG and RTL, regarding programmes with political relevant content.108 
In the times of the inception of private broadcasting, the concept of external pluralism was 
deemed sufficient (Humphreys, 1994: 263). It was assumed that a plurality of different 
broadcasters would create a plurality of opinions and thus the necessary public sphere of 
democratic discourse. However, the decisive question remains: does a plethora of channels 
and programmes provide plurality of opinion? And does it provide relevant and 
comprehensive political information?  
Admittedly, in total, German private broadcasters provide more than 300 regional, 
nationwide, full coverage and specialised television channels, including sole news channels 
such as n-tv. The private sector thus offers a broad spectrum in which plurality is guaranteed 
and in which the viewers are enabled to choose a channel with political and societal relevant 
content. The actual behaviour of viewers and the developments in the programme planning of 
private broadcasters, however, calls these considerations into question. Firstly, in 2010, 84 per 
cent of viewers regularly watched ten different channels, among them full coverage channels 
of the two largest private broadcasters and the public service broadcasters (Schwotzer, 2011: 
39).109 Only an additional one per cent of the market share of viewers was allocated to the 
special news channel n-tv. This means that despite the plethora of channels and programmes, 
only ten television channels actually create the public sphere. Secondly, the private 
broadcasting companies ProSieben.Sat1 Media AG and RTL succeeded in drawing an 
average of 46.5 per cent viewers in 2010 to their television programmes (Schwotzer, 2011: 
39; Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich, 2011: 72 and 73).110 
Thirdly, in the last twelve years, the state media authorities ascertained in their programme 
analysis of private broadcasters an incremental reduction of political relevant news coverage 
and information offers (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 35). Within 
the spectrum of channels watched by 46.5 per cent of the viewers, the two largest private 
broadcasters, ProSieben.Sat1 Media AG and RTL, averaged in 2009 politically relevant 
information of 4 per cent (RTL), 2 per cent (VOX), 1 per cent (Sat.1), 1 per cent (RTL II) or 
nothing at all (ProSieben and kabel eins) (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten, 
2011b: 279). The state media authorities’ programme analysis employed the notion of 
political journalism and controversial subjects as denoting political relevant information 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten, 2011b: 279). 
The state media authorities are aware of these developments and the negative 
repercussions for societal discourse and the societal brief private broadcasting has 
(Langheinrich, 2011; Langheinrich, 2010).111 Concurrently, as a response and a media policy 
strategic act, private broadcasters affirmed their societal obligations and questioned the 
narrow notion of information and the overall debate.112 The costly production of news offers 
                                                 
108 See in this regard Nachrichtenanteile in Privatsendern gehen zurück. DLM-Symposium: Programmbericht 
Fernsehen 2010 vorgelegt, 12 epd medien of 25 March 2011, 14. 
109 Sat.1, ProSieben, kabel eins, RTL, RTL II, Super RTL, VOX, Das Erste, ZDF, ARD/Third channels. 
110 The channels by the two private broadcasters taken into account are: RTL, RTL II, Super RTL, VOX, and n-
tv (all RTL-Group), Sat.1, ProSieben, and kabel eins (all ProSieben.Sat.1 AG).  
111 See also Direktorenkonferenz der Landesmedienanstalten (DLM), Nachrichtensendungen im privaten 
Rundfunk. Ein Positionspapier, Stuttgart 2010. The Chairs of the fourteen state media authorities addressed this 
issue on their annual media policy symposium: Direktorenkonferenz der Landesmedienanstalten (DLM), Wie 
viel Fernsehqualität wollen wir uns leisten?, press release of 8 March 2010. 
112 Press release of 2 March 2010, VPRT zu Positionspaper der Landesmediensnatalten zu 
‘Nachrichtensendungn im privaten Rundfunk’, available at: 
http://www.vprt.de/verband/presse/pressemitteilungen/content/vprt-zu-positionspapier-der-
landesmedienanstalten-zu-%E2%80%9Enach, accessed 17 October 2011. 
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and the competitive market situation, both offline in the television market and online, are the 
two main arguments brought forward.113 However, the financing argument regarding news 
applies only under an economic logic concerning private television productions, in which a 
programme has to be commercially viable otherwise it will be cancelled. As news bulletins 
contradict commercial logic with their format and requirements the question arises as to 
whether they should be valued differently. This is especially pertinent given that the annual 
turnover of the RTL group increased in 2010 (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 79-81) and the basic production costs decreased overall 
(Goldhammer, 2011: 190-191). 
As a result of the purported decrease in the news and information content of the 
channel VOX, the state media authorities, in their role as a supervisory organ, stressed in a re-
examination procedure of operators’ licences the obligation to provide information and news 
contents in order to retain licences.114 Besides these concrete and single measures, the state 
media authorities commissioned an academic study to structurally explore the options for 
enhancing journalistic efforts in the private broadcasters’ information programmes 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 35). The comprehensive and 
thorough study ‘Regulation through Incentives’ is founded on the premise that normative 
regulation might not succeed in achieving creative output, which lies at the root of high 
quality journalistic content (Schulz and Held, 2011: 21-22). The study calls for a thorough 
examination of the existing legislation to determine possible incentives for private operators 
to broadcast news content or documentaries. The incentives can include privileged access to 
transmission infrastructure or relaxation of advertising regulation (Schulz and Held, 2011: 
106-110). The question whether to draw upon the public service broadcaster’s licence fees 
was not part of the study’s commission. Representatives of the private broadcasters, the state 
media authorities and scientific researchers discussed the results of the study at the state 
media authorities’ annual Director’s Symposium. The study was received controversially by 
private operators115 and the debate remains ongoing (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 17). Although the underpinning concept of incentives for 
more journalistic content is appealing, it is still undecided as to whether it will actually be 
successful and facilitate content production.116 The debate illustrates how media policy can be 
steered by the actors involved. The state media authorities discerned a lacuna in the private 
operator’s programmes regarding news. As the first debates in 2010 did not succeed in 
changing the situation, the state media authorities supplemented their claims with a 
comprehensive and thorough examination of the legal framework, examining the possible 
legislative options. 
 
4.1.2 News coverage in public service broadcasting 
The structure of public service broadcasting in Germany entails a form that facilitates and 
promotes diverse channels and programmes. Eleven public service broadcasting stations 
contribute to programming including the two nationwide television channels, nine regional 
television channels, a nationwide radio station and an external radio, television and online 
                                                 
113 Ibid. See also: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 35. 
114 Die medienanstalten, ZAK-Pressemitteilung 09/2010, Landesmedienanstalten richten weiter Fokus auf 
private Nachrichtenangebote, press relase of 18 June 2010. 
115 DLM Symposium, Public Value: Was soll der private Rundfunk für die Gesellschaft leisten?, press release of 
18 March 2011. 
116 It is questionable, for instance, whether the Swiss fee transference and evaluation model for private 
broadcasters actually enhances news-bulletins significantly. It is still to decide, if the implementation of 
programme requirements for the Swiss private broadcasters are effectively adhered to. Based on the interview 
with Prof. K. Imhof of 2 June 2011. 
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service. The television channel Das Erste, for instance, is produced in a working coalition of 
the nine regional broadcasters (ARD) with a clear partition of responsibilities for single 
programmes and with a slightly different political inclination. This construction encourages a 
plurality of opinions. Furthermore, the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty obliges all public 
service broadcasters to offer in their programming, among other things, a comprehensive 
overview of international, European, national and regional events in all relevant areas of life. 
This implies also the requirement to respect plurality of opinion, which must be mirrored in 
the programmes transmitted and presented online. 
The basic programme regulation in the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty provides the 
national public service broadcasters with a more focused remit than the private operators: it 
states that public service broadcasters ‘act through the production and transmission of their 
offers as a medium and factor in the process of formation of free individual and public 
opinion, and thereby serving the democratic, social, and cultural needs of society.’117 Thus in 
relation to private programme requirements, the law requires public service broadcasters to 
fulfil the societal needs of a democratic society, which includes a diverse outlet of 
programmes including news bulletins and other political relevant information. It would 
exceed the space available to comprehensively probe into the question as whether the public 
service broadcasters in Germany live up to the standards established in the law. An 
examination would have to address the difficult question of programme quality, which is not 
an easy undertaking to gauge scientifically (Kammann, Jurkuhn and Wolf, 2007: 67; Trebbe 
and Woelke, 2011: 206f.). Nevertheless, some observations shall be given based on 
discussions of programme critics in media and other publications. Taking the two full 
coverage television channels, Das Erste and ZDF, into account, it is argued that 
commercialisation of the programmes can be ascertained as they try to compete with the 
private operators.118 This has purportedly led to broadly accepted productions aired in prime 
time, while documentations and in-depth analysis regarding controversial but relevant societal 
and political issues are aired very late. Furthermore, the public service broadcaster radio 
stations of the nine regional broadcasting stations air shorter and more mainstream coverage 
and thus often exclude necessary background information. They also cut overall expenses by 
reducing the number of journalists in regional networks working for television and radio 
stations, which exacerbates working conditions at the regional level, especially for time 
consuming investigative research and productions. These developments are tempered by 
public service broadcasters’ thematic channels airing mostly on culture, such as 3sat, or on 
news, such Phoenix. However, these channels account for only one per cent of total television 
viewers each.119 Despite these observations, public service broadcasters in general still air 
high quality information programmes and serve the societal needs in a democracy. 
Furthermore, public service broadcasters’ regional activities, especially the regional 
programmes, facilitate the cultural identity of the inhabitants of the different states. The fact 
that the national public service broadcasters’ online platforms offer manifold on demand 
videos and other information committed to high standards also merits attention. The 
programme analysis undertaken by the state media authorities illustrates the distinct approach 
to political relevant information aired by the public service broadcasters. While the daily 
airtime allocated to political journalism and controversial subjects by private broadcasters 
ranges from four per cent (RTL) to no programmes at all (ProSieben), the public service 
broadcasters programmes reach very different percentages. The nationwide television full 
coverage channel Das Erste averaged a daily percentage of 18 per cent of airtime allocated to 
                                                 
117 Art. 11 para. 1 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
118 Kammann, Jurkuhn and Wolf, 2007: 97ff provide an overview of the discussions. More recently Kammann, 
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political journalism and controversial subjects, while ZDF averaged 17 per cent 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten, 2011b: 279-280). Public service 
broadcasters provide additional regional political relevant information aired by the nine 
different broadcasting stations on their television channels (Die Dritten) or on radio. Das 
Erste, ZDF, and the regional television channels account for 38.8 per cent of total viewers in 
Germany and thus constitute a public sphere of programmes and viewers comparable to one 
of the private broadcasters (Schwotzer, 2011: 39).120 These numbers testify for the different 
output of private and public service broadcasters. 
While it is difficult to ascertain the programme quality of news bulletins, it is even 
more difficult to ascertain state influence on public service broadcasters’ content. This is 
simply because legal and other structures seek to curb the influence of state actors such as 
governmental representatives, and because open and direct influence occurs only occasionally 
and randomly. As outlined above, the Broadcasting Councils, which are the governing bodies, 
consist of a majority of representatives from the relevant societal groups, in order to confine 
the influence of state or party representatives on their activities. However, some cases have 
arisen in which an indirect effect on the programming and its political orientation might be 
identified. In 2009, the Administrative Council of the ZDF refused to give its consent in a 
reappointment of a Chief Editor presumably for political reasons.121 The relevant articles of 
the Interstate Treaty of the Second German Television are currently being contested before 
the Federal Constitutional Court in an application submitted by the State Government of 
Rhineland-Palatinate in November 2010.122 Furthermore, in 2010 the Bavarian Broadcasting 
station appointed the former speaker of the conservative Federal Government as General 
Director, which also potentially raises the question of a certain political inclination.123 In 
another case, however, a Broadcasting Council rejected a candidate favoured by the state 
government. In a recent event, the MDR Broadcasting Council rejected the proposed 
candidate for the position of Director General, although the proposing Administrative 
Council, influenced by the three state governments of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, 
had chosen the candidate.124 Here, the democratic function of the Broadcasting Council fared 
well and exemplifies the increasing self-confidence of the governing bodies.125 
 
4.1.3 Content requirements: rules imposing accurate, impartial and balanced reporting 
for print media, broadcasting and new online media services 
Any journalistic or editorial content is subject to regulatory content requirements regarding 
accurate reporting. Rules apply for private and public broadcasting, stemming from the 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty regulation and statutory legislation.126 Print products must 
respect basic accuracy rules laid down in statutory state press laws and self-regulatory, detailed 
standards laid down in the Press Code.127 It has to be stressed that the most comprehensive 
                                                 
120 See also Media Perspektiven. Basisdaten, 2010: 77 with comparable numbers. 
121 For an analysis of the legal background see Dörr, 2009. 
122 As already mentioned above under section 3.4. 
123 The election contradicts Resolution 1636 (2008) “Indicators for media in a democracy” of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, stipulating under no. 8.20 that senior management positions should be 
refused to people with clear party political affiliations. 
124 Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (MDR), Noch kein Nachfolger für MDR-Intendanten, press release of 26 
September 2011. A new, different Director-General was appointed in October 2011. 
125 To complement the picture: there have been single cases in which the internal supervision mechanisms did 
not work sufficiently. For example, regarding the children’s channel under the auspices of the MDR, financial 
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medien of 4 November 2011, 8-9. 
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impartiality and balance requirements exist only for public service broadcasters, while private 
broadcasting is required only to take different opinions into account, and print media or 
political blogs are more free to publicise content with a clear bias, as long as journalistic 
standards are respected (i.e. delineation of fact and comment). Journalistic and editorial online 
content’s regulation depends on its outlets. Online content by public service broadcasters has 
to adhere to the same standards as laid down for their broadcasting content. In addition, the 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty provides for accurate reporting requirements for journalistic 
editorial online content. The law aims to oblige the content provider of online news websites, 
politically relevant online magazines or blogs as well as the online version of traditional press 
outlets to adhere to basic journalistic standards. These include delineation of reporting and 
opinion, accuracy in research and checking and assessment of sources.128 The same accounts 
for private broadcasters online content that are not considered broadcasting (such as on 
demand programmes). The question of whether all regulatory obligations and self-regulatory 
standards are adhered to is difficult to ascertain and remains an ongoing process for the actors 
involved. While the Broadcasting Councils and the Director General of the public service 
broadcasters monitor the implementation of legal requirements, the state media authorities 
monitor private broadcasters. Furthermore, press products and online content providers submit 
to the revision and sanction procedure of the German Press Council on the basis of voluntary 
self-commitment. While it is relatively easy to obtain the self-commitment from traditional 
print media publishers, the multitude of actors and the dynamics of online offers raise the 
question whether the Press Council will be able to include them in the revision system. The 
media-tailored system is supplemented by general laws such as libel, defamation, or protection 
of personal dignity applicable to all outlets and enforced by criminal or civil courts. These 
rights contribute to accurate reporting, as publishers or website owners can become liable and 
exposed to potential damages. 
Hence, rules imposing accurate, impartial and balanced reporting exist with a different 
degree of obligations and the regulation or self-regulatory standards are subject of independent 
external (like the state media authorities, the ZAK or the Press Council) or internal (like the 
Broadcasting Councils) supervision procedures as applicable.129 
 
4.1.4 A subsidy system for press outlets? A recurring debate of a ‘public service press’ 
The German media landscape is comprised of different outlets: press, magazines, 
broadcasting (radio and television), and online media services. The latter display the most 
differentiated and vivid developments, as the traditional media publish content online and sole 
online news services exist simultaneously. Traditionally, print media and its online content 
are not subject to any financing regulation. Accounting for this is the historical development, 
to rely on the market to provide the necessary diversification and plurality of press products. 
The current financing regime of the broadcasting sector was also shaped by the developments 
in the last few decades. The private sector relies on advertising revenue, while public service 
broadcasters are financed by fees. The financial situation of online services depends on their 
organisational circumstances. Advertising revenues finance the online content of private 
broadcasters, while the public service broadcasters can invest in online services on the basis 
of fees. Critical blogs and other politically relevant online platforms have to be financially 
backed by donations, online advertising, or member fees when they are organised as legal 
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129 See for the Press Council system: Desgranges and Wassink, 2005; for public service broadcasters: Hahn, 
2010: 145ff.; Staffelt, 2009; for private broadcasters: Donges, 2011: 11-34; Fechner, 2003; Klass, 2011: 45ff.; 
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associations. With the exception of the tax reduction of 7 per cent VAT for press products130 
(compared to the regular 19 per cent VAT for other goods), the state does not provide any 
subsidies for press products.  
The economic situation131 of some publishers providing press outlets, especially for 
the regional and local press as well as the Frankfurter Rundschau, a nationwide print product, 
triggers the discussion on journalism as a public good that has to be financed. Such a 
financing model could include tax reimbursements for subscriptions and the exclusion of 
press products from VAT obligations (Eumann, 2011: 98). The debate recurs regularly, 
because the local and regional press market declines incrementally in terms of advertising 
revenues and, partly, subscriptions. The main consideration focuses on the need for a forum in 
which regional and local matters can be discussed adequately, as it is feared that the relevant 
content will either not be provided by regional or local media outlets or the outlet at issue will 
disappear altogether. This is the case if a publisher terminates the publication of a regional 
newspaper or if broadcasting ceases to cover regional or local affairs. Although in all 
likelihood, the private publishers would dismiss the idea of a state or publically financed 
press,132 due to the fear of state influence, tax reductions might be welcome. However a 
political majority to support the idea is lacking. Thus, the print publishers are seeking to 
introduce alternative models of financing. The North German online platform of the 
newspaper Hamburger Abendblatt requires payment for access to some of its online 
content.133 The alternative newspaper taz in Berlin follows different strategies including 
awareness-rising for fair payment for online content instead of a culture of free access through 
conferences, online campaigns134 and a collective of shareholders financing a fund for the 
newspapers.135 Finally, private publishers are seeking to obtain new revenue options in the 
form of an ancillary copyright law for publishers.  This is politically contested because of its 
impracticability. The draft is still at the early stages of the legislative process. Interestingly, 
the debate sometimes obviates the knowledge of viable online offers that work profitably, as 
it was stated in a public hearing ‘Future of Quality Journalism’, held by the Federal 
Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Media.136 
 
4.2 Competing interests and legal restraints on content diversification  
 
4.2.1 The rule of law and the protection of informants and sources of information: the 
balance of relevant information in a democratic society and the good functioning of 
criminal prosecution  
The European and the German national courts proclaimed in various proceedings that 
protection of journalists’ informants or sources of information is a prerequisite for a 
functioning press and thus an independent media.137 Without such protection, the necessary 
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131 See the analysis by Beck, Reineck and Schubert, 2010: 46-88. 
132 This stance is documented in a study published in 2009 by Weichert and Kramp, 2009: 46-47. 
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democratic control of the state and the state’s action by the media might be impeded, because 
the media has to rely on sources from within the state organisations and bodies, which might 
withdraw without protection. On the other hand, the state has a justifiable interest in protecting 
its data, such as secret documents or political delicate opinion building processes, against the 
public. This implies the prosecution of criminal acts when it comes to an incriminated 
violation of secret information, for instance when media publish confidential documents of 
parliamentary committees.138 Hence, a regulation has to be found to balance these antagonistic 
aspects.  
The German legislation illustrates that finding a compromise has challenged political 
actors. Although the Federal Constitutional Court decided in 1966 that the legislature had to 
gauge the various different interests and come to a practical conclusion,139 the resultant 
legislation and its implementation were again criticised by the Federal Constitutional Court as 
unconstitutional in a case decided in 2007.140 Admittedly, different aspects had to be 
considered, which rendered the legislative process demanding. Two key issues in particular 
merit attention. Firstly, there is the issue of the immunity from criminal liability in cases in 
which secret documents were received from sources and then published. The second is the 
issue of procedural protection from police searches in freelance journalists’ premises. In 2010, 
the governing parties instigated a legislative procedure to amend the Criminal Law.141 The 
objective of the draft was clear: to exclude journalists from criminal liability for breach of state 
secrets in cases in which they have not actively incited the informant. Although introduced in 
the Federal Parliament by the Federal Government, the Free Democratic Party and the 
Christian Democratic Party seem to espouse different stances in this regard. In a speech given 
in the Federal Parliament for example, it was said that the necessity of the draft had to be 
scrutinised carefully.142 Reference was also given to the possible conflict with the conservative 
Chair of the Legal Committee in this regard.143 Both statements can only be interpreted as 
dismissive. An almost-detrimental position was presented by the State Secretary of the Federal 
Ministry of Justice in his speech in the Bundesrat, the State Chamber, in which he reflects on 
the necessity of a new regulation to protect journalists’ sources.144 It is still unclear whether 
this internal debate among the governing parties will finally lead to an enactment of the draft 
or delay the process until a next electoral term.  
Interesting and not commonly known, the existing legislation in the German Penal 
Code of Procedure145 and its interpretation by the courts146 may violate the ECHR. The joint 
legal experts’ opinion of the German Journalists’ Association (DJV) and others brought this up 
during the public hearing of the above-mentioned draft.147 On the basis of the ECtHR’s 
rulings148 they noted that the ECtHR prescribes that only a judge or another independent body 
shall be entitled to issue a search order in cases when the journalist’s relationship to his/her 
source is at stake.149 While the legislation provides for such procedural safeguards for editorial 
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premises, this is not the case for the journalist’s private premises or the offices of freelance 
journalists.150 As more and more journalists do not work as employees with print media or in 
broadcasting, documents and data leading to the source may be stored at home, rather than at 
editorial offices. 
 
4.2.2 Protection of privacy vs. the public’s interest for information 
Striking the balance between the protection of a person’s privacy or personal rights 
[Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht], which is rooted in the constitutional principle of each 
person’s dignity, and the public’s interest in information [öffentliches Informationsinteresse], 
is an ongoing, day-to-day process for journalists. Only some strict legal rules exist such as 
libel and defamation to prohibit the publishing of defamatory statements about another 
person. However, whether a publication infringes the rights of a person (such as the rights to 
protection of privacy or family life) depends on the degree of private information shared and 
the degree of justifiable public interest. The Federal Constitutional Court has developed the 
legal interpretation in which the courts must balance the right of the person with the right to 
freedom of information. In the words of the Court, ‘The protection of one’s personal rights 
can be limited in view of the conflicting public interest.’151 The conflicting positions and 
interests have to be balanced by the courts, which have to discern what right prevails in light 
of all the relevant circumstances.152 The national courts engage in a process to weigh the 
justifiable interest of the public in being informed against the privacy interests in order to 
conclude whether personal rights were infringed.153 For example, it might be justifiable to 
report on a politician’s private affairs if they contradict obviously the positions he or she 
stands for in public in order for the electorate to gauge his or her credibility. However, if there 
is no possible link to political activity, reporting might not be justifiable. Thus, public interest 
will not prevail in every case and it remains in the responsibility of the journalist or the editor 
to decide in each case whether to publish a piece of information. The German legal system 
provides flexible, but also sometimes unpredictable, protection for personal rights that curb 
publication. Not uncommonly, legal action is sought with civil courts as they can impose 
injunctions with high monetary repercussions. 
Another aspect of the right of privacy lies in the publication of photographs. 
Originally, the German law had provided a limited protection for well-known persons, 
defined as ‘a figure of contemporary society par excellence’, such as politicians, film stars or 
other celebrities. The legal situation had precluded basically most of the demands from 
members of this group not to be photographed and then depicted in press or journals. In the 
judgment Hannover v. Germany,154 the ECtHR rectified this legal situation for Germany, as it 
discerned a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. The judgment stems from a complaint by 
Caroline von Hannover whose pictures of her going about her daily business were published 
in German magazines. The Court balanced the right to respect for private life and the freedom 
of the press differently and required that the publication of photographs refers to a debate of 
general interest.155 A publication did not violate Article 8 ECHR if it were justified by 
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considerations of public concerns.156 Admittedly, the judgment only has little influence on 
political relevant information, because it concerned mostly the boulevard press.157 However, 
political journalism must take into account the protection of privacy of politicians as well and 
decide whether to publish a photograph or not. 
 
4.2.3 The public service broadcasters’ online activities and viable offers of private 
operators and publishers 
The legislature sought to balance with the 12th Amendment to the Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty158 the economic interests of private broadcasters and publishers on the one side and the 
interests of public service broadcasters to be present in the online environment on the other 
side. Instigated by the state aid procedure of the European Commission on the financing 
regime of the public service broadcasters, the state legislatures adopted several provisions to 
regulate the public service broadcasters’ online activities. We discussed the political and 
procedural circumstances and ramifications in chapter three. Here we want to focus on the 
conflict of interests as regards the content services provided.159 Basically, private broadcasters 
and publishers fear that public service broadcasters’ content might foreclose otherwise viable 
online services, while the public service broadcasters fear that stricter regulation might 
foreclose its future audience and thus its future. The former bring forward arguments 
premised on economic considerations.160 The latter assume the Internet will complement the 
existing media landscape or even change it significantly. The consumer behaviour especially 
of individuals up to 29 years of age testifies to this assumption, as 97-98 per cent use the 
Internet regularly.161 The legislature sought to balance the interests described with the 
restrictions and co-regulatory procedures of the Broadcasting Councils, implicating a negative 
list, de-publishing requirements and a comprehensive procedure for the adoption of specific 
online activities. As further developments might require a differentiated legislation, it remains 
with the media politicians and the legislature to balance the economical interests to the public 
service idea of a free and independent communicative space enabling individual and 
collective opinion forming (Rossen-Stadtfeld, 2009, 32f.). 
 
4.3 Conclusion: composition and diversification of media content 
As was shown in the preceding analysis, the composition and diversification of media content 
necessary for free and independent democratic and public discourse is a field of tensions 
characterised by partly competing interests. The legislature and the courts have reacted 
differently to this situation and have created a legal framework for media content, while 
concurrently adhering to the principle of media freedom from the state. While private 
broadcasters and, particularly, state media authorities are aware of broadcasting’s democratic 
function, economic considerations curb political relevant information programmes and news 
bulletins from private broadcasting operators and thus question the basic legal content 
requirements. The basic configuration of the German public service broadcasting and its 
content requirements engender a free and independent communicative space with diverse 
outlets for public opinion forming, although criticism exists regarding the composition of the 
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governing bodies and partly regarding the quality of the content. Here, state influence has had 
to be curtailed within single stations. However, state interests also challenge free and 
independent media in their role as a watchdog of democracy, as journalistic cooperation with 
informants and the publication of confidential information show. While the legislature still 
seems reluctant to adopt clearer regulation to protect journalists from unwarranted criminal 
prosecution, the Federal Constitutional Court has safeguarded journalists’ position. In the field 
of privacy and personal rights, the media does not act completely freely, but with regard to 
justified public interest in information. Here, the ECtHR has refined the broad and press-
friendly legal interpretation regarding photographs. Simultaneously, legal action with civil 
courts curbs what could well be necessary and justified coverage as injunctions imposed 
impede journalistic work. 
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5. The journalistic profession 
 
5.1 Working conditions for journalists: the economic foundation of free and 
independent journalism 
It is a simple truth that it is people who create intellectual content in the form of free and 
independent journalism and that they need to be paid adequately for this work. In the study 
‘Journalistic quality in times of economic crisis’, conducted by Beck, Reineck and Schubert  
the authors made (2010: 68) a comparable statement: ‘As editorial offices fill print products 
with intellectual content, it is a prerequisite to maintain them with sufficient personnel, in 
order to ensure quality in press outlets and magazines.’162 Journalism as a backbone of a 
democratic press relies on financially sufficient framework conditions that ensure and provide 
the necessary working conditions for journalists. Of course, the understanding of sufficient 
financing may vary regarding the outlet involved and the editor’s approach. A small and 
specialised online news service or political blog does not require the same budget as a full 
coverage television broadcasting or a nationwide press outlet. Furthermore, good quality or 
investigative journalism is determined not only by financial considerations, but also by the 
applicable legal framework (for example regarding protection of sources, freedom of 
information, criminal liability for journalists), education, and organisational working 
conditions (Schulzki-Haddouti, Bunjes and Geribert, 2009: 21ff.; Eichhoff, 2010: 189ff.). 
Nevertheless, to fulfil the requirements of a public watchdog, as is necessary in a democracy, 
journalists need to be able to think analytically and critically. The media also require the 
necessary staffing, adequate income and financial and social security for the personnel.  
Several studies and conference publications (Beck, Reineck and Schubert, 2010; 
Lüneborg and Berghofer, 2010; Donsbach, et al., 2009; Meyen and Riesmeyer, 2009; 
Schröder and Schwanebeck, 2011; Weischenberg, Malik and Scholl, 2006)163 exist which 
address these questions and their importance for the quality of journalism or the role of 
journalists in a democratic society. Not all relevant issues can be addressed here. It is also 
impossible to examine the working conditions of journalists without engaging in some sort of 
simplification. The economic situation of the Axel Springer AG as a highly viable 
entrepreneur differs significantly from a small publisher of a press outlet in North-Eastern 
Germany for instance.164 Thus, the basic observations made below illustrate some general 
trends in Germany.  
Firstly, the overall working conditions currently enable journalists to produce press, 
broadcasting, and online outlets relevant for societal and democratic discourses. The annual 
turnover of private broadcasting, the fees of the public service broadcaster, as well as the 
figures of the private press publishers testify to the financial background needed for sufficient 
working conditions.  
Secondly, the editorial offices have to cope with more and more tasks but with a 
declining number of journalists (Lüneborg and Berghofer, 2010: 43-44; Blöbaum, et al., 2011: 
58.) The journalists in charge of a print outlet or a broadcast have to analyse more and more 
information provided by news agencies and other online services. Public service broadcasters 
have restructured their stations and introduced online media departments. In addition to the 
radio and television skills, journalists in these editorial offices have had to learn how to 
produce online content as well.  
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Thirdly, editorial offices cannot afford more significant personnel cuts. The same 
point has been made in a study regarding the working conditions for journalists focusing on 
political issues in all media formats (Lüneborg and Berghofer, 2010: 43-44). For instance, the 
public service broadcasters have announced restructuring measures due to austerity 
obligations165 and it will have to be seen whether the implementation will be strategic in such 
a way that synergy effects enhance the outlets or only serve to reduce the necessary local and 
regional networks of journalists. Furthermore, press publishers have reduced journalistic 
personnel or created news pools for various outlets (Beck, Reineck and Schubert, 2010: 149-
167). While short-term benefits might occur or even allow these print outlets to continue their 
work, the use of news pools or merged editorial offices for different press outlets curtails 
media plurality, considered a property of quality journalism (Beck, Reineck and Schubert, 
2010: 235-236). The involvement of investment companies in the print sector had also some 
repercussions on the editorial composition and austerity measures beyond any practical 
feasibility, as revenue requirements brought into question the sufficiency of working 
conditions for journalists (Lichtenstein, 2011).166  
Fourthly, media companies can only produce their outlets with the help of freelance 
journalists. While full time employed journalists provide the backbone of the provision of 
journalism services, freelance journalists, including those engaged full-time, significantly 
complement their work. However, the financial situation of freelance journalists has been 
stagnating or deteriorating and thus, presumably, also their willingness to invest into time-
consuming printed articles or other media coverage.167 Freelance journalists’ income is 
documented by the journalists’ union DJV based on a survey of 2,187 participants in 2008.168 
According to the survey, the average net income (after tax and social security contributions) 
amounts to 1,600 euros.169 However, the income groups are divided: 69 per cent of all 
freelance journalists earn less than 1,600 euros.170  
Finally, since 2001 private print publishers of daily newspapers have faced a slow but 
steady decrease in sold copies and advertising revenue (Beck, Reineck and Schubert, 2010: 
86-88; Keller, 2010: 47 and 90). While in 2010, 19.44 million copies of daily newspapers 
were sold daily,171 the figures available for October 2011 testify a slight decline to 18.83 
million copies.172 The overall turnover complements the sale figures, and it allows us to draw 
some conclusions on publishers’ financial situation. Due to the positive economic 
developments in 2011, the turnover of private publishers increased slightly to 8.52 billion 
euros.173 Although revenues did not decline - they actually increased - the private publishers 
presume the market situation will worsen in the long run. The fiercely fought negotiations for 
a new collective wage agreement illustrate the publishers’ stance, as they sought to reduce the 
income of new employees. The two journalists’ unions, the German Journalists Union (the 
Deutsche Journalisten Union, hereafter referred to as the dju) and the German Journalists 
Association (the Deutscher Journalisten Verband, referred to as the DJV), as well as the 
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employers association, the Federal Association of German Print Publishers (the 
Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, hereafter referred to as the BDZV) agreed in 
August 2011 to a new collective wage agreement. The agreement applies to almost 14,000 
journalists in print media.174 A dispute erupted over the income of newly employed journalists 
in the print and online sector. While the BDZV espoused the idea of a reformed agreement in 
which new employees should be paid less, the unions sought to defend the status quo to 
prevent a ‘two class wages’ model. The unions have succeeded so far, although the publishers 
still pursue this distinction.175 These developments illustrate the overall assumptions 
regarding market conditions and the prognosis that the business model of a sole printed press 
product might not prevail in the future media landscape. However, credible new ideas for 
other successful business model do not exist at this stage.176 
 
5.2 Safeguarding journalistic work and standards: education of journalists, unions, 
ethical and editorial standards 
Different aspects are considered necessary to ensure independent and qualitative journalistic 
work. Among them are a sufficient education,177 ethical and editorial standards, an editorial 
system of checking the information before publication, and a union system. Besides these 
aspects, a system of online forums to discuss and evaluate journalistic work may be helpful.  
Premised on the democratic idea that journalism shall, among other things, monitor 
and where necessary point out misconduct in societal and state affairs, no formal criteria exist 
to be fulfilled before one can work or consider oneself a journalist. In practice, however, some 
structures have emerged and currently shape the training background of journalists. In 
general, journalists will obtain a university degree and undergo additional practical training in 
the media [Volontariat] before assuming a freelance or employed position in the media. Some 
universities178 as well as private journalism schools179 provide a tailored education for 
journalists. These studies comprise usually basic subjects in journalism, political science, 
ethics and philosophy, economics as well as legal aspects followed by a practical training and 
the option for further specialisation.180 During the courses students can learn about journalism 
in political affairs. Drawing from the available literature (Fengler and Vestring, 2009), 
students can receive an overview of the practical effect of the political mechanism and how 
journalists and journalism assume a specific function in it. To be aware of possible 
manipulations or misleading information and to contextualise them is an important 
characteristic of politic journalism in political affairs. How to assess the source of information 
is, thus, an important professional technique, addressed in the courses available. Whether the 
time frame for investigative research or the daily work of a journalist in the capital Berlin 
allows for following these techniques is another question.181 It has to be reiterated that 
although specific vocational training is not required to work as journalist, in practice this is 
                                                 
174 DJV, press release of 18 August 2011, Tageszeitungen. Journalistenstreiks waren erfolgreich. 
175 BDZV, press release of 18 August 2011, BDZV: Neuer Tarifvertrag bringt Planungssicherheit für Verlage. 
176 Wolfgang Blau (Chief Editor of Zeit.online), public hearing at the Federal Parliaments Committee on Culture 
and Media, Protocol no. 17/31 of 23 February 2011, p. 8. 
177 Federal Parliaments Committee on Culture and Media, Protocol no. 17/31, p. 10-11. 
178 Institut für Journalistik und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität Hamburg, http://www.wiso.uni-
hamburg.de/institute/ijk, accessed 26 October 2011; Institut für Journalistik, TU Dortmund, 
http://www.journalistik-dortmund.de/start.html, accessed 26 October 2011. 
179 Deutsche Journalisten Schule [German Journalist School] http://www.djs-online.de/, accessed 26 October 
2011; Henri-Nannen-Schule http://www.journalistenschule.de/, accessed 26 October 2011. 
180 See for instance: Institute for journalism of the Technical University of Dortmund: Studienverlaufsplan 
Studiengang Journalistik. 
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very common. Thus, the education can provide the necessary basis for independent and 
critical journalism. 
Journalists’ unions seek to ensure the political and legal framework conditions that 
engender independent journalism. As mentioned above, in Germany, two unions represent the 
interests of journalists, the dju and the DJV. While the dju is affiliated with the union 
coalition ver.di, one of the largest unions in Germany, the DJV presents itself as a 
combination of an independent union and professional organisation.182 According to its self-
presentation, dju fosters, among other things, the professional, social, and economic interests 
of its members, espouses media policies and contributes to the protection of the freedom of 
the press.183 DJV fosters and pursues similar political and ethical aims.184 Both organisations 
represent a large number of journalists working full time in the media, with DJV having 
38,000 members185 and the dju representing approximately another 20,000 persons.186 
Journalists are entitled to join the unions if they can submit a working contract or a tax 
document that evidence their income. They can also join as freelancers, if their main income 
results from journalistic work. However, as the interests of employed journalists and a 
freelancer differ, specific professional associations also exist for freelancers.187  
Journalists’ unions seek to safeguard professional standards and the legal as well as 
economic working conditions of journalists in different ways. The dju and the DJV are vested 
with the power to negotiate and sign collective wage agreements with the employer 
association BDZV and thus support the legal basis for a sufficient income. However, single 
private publishers of press products dispensed with their membership in the agreement in 
order to no longer be bound by collective agreements, which has weakened the unions’ 
position. On the other hand, strikes organised by the unions as well as negotiations in August 
2011 led to a newly adopted collective agreement.  
Furthermore, both unions seek to influence the applicable legal framework conditions 
for journalists. These include for instance the protection of information sources due to the 
amendment of the Penal Code and legislation on data retention. The DJV’s legal adviser 
presented the unions’ position in a public hearing of the Federal Parliament’s Legal 
Committee on the protection of journalists and their informants.188 The DJV and the dju 
supported the constitutional complaint against the German legislation transposing the Data 
Retention Directive,189 because of the purported impediments to communication with 
informants. The Federal Constitutional Court quashed the national legislation because of 
deficient precautions for data protection, but did not question the data retention in general. 190 
The journalists’ unions possess avenues to negotiate and influence the legal framework, 
although political circumstances sometimes curtail their influence. This can be seen in the 
tedious legislative procedure for better protection for journalists’ informants. 
Another important tool to safeguard journalistic work lies in the German Press 
Council. Organised as self-regulatory body, the private publishers’ associations BDZV 
(newspapers) and VDZ (magazines), and the unions DJV and dju are part of the legal 
                                                 
182 According to its self-presentation: http://www.djv.de/UEber-uns.17.0.html, accessed 26 October 2011. 
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association which maintain the German Press Council.191 They dispatch union and publisher 
representatives to the association and provide financial means to cover its expenses. The 
system is based on the self-regulatory journalistic principles as enshrined in the Press Code. 
The Code provides guidelines for journalistic work including basic principles for investigative 
research, delineation of editorial text and advertising, data protection, and coverage of 
violence and disasters. The respect for the truth and the human dignity, the profound research, 
and the respect for privacy are core values of the Press Council. Those principles aim to 
ensure a basic quality for journalistic work and seek to instil public confidence in the media. 
In 2010, the German Press Council decided on 812 complaints of which 223 found a breach 
of the Press Code standards (Deutscher Presserat, 2011: 197 and 199). The Press Council’s 
Statute requests press publishers and journalistic online content providers to sign the self-
commitment to the Press Code; here, the unions as well as the publisher associations assume 
the function of requesting their members to do so.192  
In the 1960s and 1970s, journalists, editors and private publishers discussed the need 
for editorial standards. Essentially, editors and journalists sought to gain a position 
independent of the owner to work freely and independently and be heard in the process of 
senior position appointments. On the other side, media owners or the management of a media 
company sought to uphold their influence. It was not possible to find a compromise and the 
responsible legislatures retreated to adopt statutory legal measures for editorial standards 
promoting inner press freedom. The legislature left it to the publishers themselves to decide 
whether they wanted to adopt such measures. This is in line with the usual liberal approach of 
the legislature in allowing the private press a broad margin. In practice, separation of editorial 
offices and newsrooms from publishers or management generally exists,193 although 
occasional attempts to influence the editorial work occur. In 2006, the debate resurfaced as 
the former owner of the Berliner Zeitung sought to implement a rigid austerity programme in 
order to increase revenue (Lichtenstein, 2011: 217-218). In addition, the then double function 
of director (for the publisher) and chief editor in one person triggered protests among the 
staff. This led to the adoption of editorial standards in 2006 by the publisher’s executive 
board, chief editor and editorial committee in order to ensure a high quality of journalistic 
work whilst seeking to curtail the influence of the owner on the staff (Beck, Reineck and 
Schubert, 2010: 196). Public service broadcasting stations are obliged to adopt editorial 
standards, when the legislation provides for such an obligation. For instance, the West 
German Broadcasting Act (WDR-Gesetz) requires that the Director-General and the 
representative body of the editors adopt in consent editorial standards.194  
It is commonly accepted that journalism in a democracy should address all subjects 
relevant to society. This is the reason why the ECtHR, for instance, often referred to the press 
as a watchdog.195 In the complex field of daily issues, however, it is not always easy to 
discern in the production of news what might be relevant or not and what should be placed on 
page one. Furthermore, the quality of an article,196 an online blog, or a broadcast can vary and 
thus in turn influence perception of the event or political development being covered. 
Democratic discourse through high quality media outlets is supported by the above-mentioned 
aspects of education, practical training, journalistic standards and broadcasters’ programme 
guidelines197 as well as reflection on and revision of articles within editorial offices by editors 
and colleagues (Lüneborg and Berghofer, 2010: 32-33). Some associations and projects merit 
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194 Art. 31 West-German-Broadcasting Act. 
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particular attention in this regard: ‘netzwerk recherche’ [research network] is an association of 
journalists which aims to promote investigative journalism. It organises conferences, 
publishes handbooks on journalistic techniques, and provides research grants.198 The 
‘Initiative Nachrichtenaufklärung’ [News Elucidation Initiative] was established in 1997 to 
address important issues that are not adequately presented or are not presented at all in the 
media.199 Backed by Bonn University and Dortmund University, it covers ten subjects 
annually which are not covered by the media but warrant attention.200 In 2011, the leading 
subject was the dearth of democratic control over the Federal Agency of Financial Market 
Stabilisation which had been entitled to govern up to 480 billion euros (German Financial 
Market Stabilisation Fund) and can now govern up to 100 billion euros (Restructuring Fund), 
according to the Initiative.201 Finally, the ‘Initiative Qualität’ merits attention.202 Professional 
associations, private publishers, public service broadcasters, media academies, journalist 
unions and self-regulatory organs of print media and private broadcasting have established 
and maintained the ‘Initiative Qualität’ network. With workshops, continuous dialogue among 
the members of the network, as well as additional practical training sessions for professionals, 
the initiative seeks to uphold a high quality of journalistic work. 
  
5.3 Digital media environment: influence of the Internet on journalism 
The Internet influences journalism and the journalistic work profoundly. During the expert 
hearing in the Federal Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Media under the topic ‘The 
Future of Quality Journalism’, the advent of the Internet and its attendant repercussions on the 
media were described as a profound change.203 The Internet influences journalists’ daily 
work, especially those working in the field of political or news journalism. Online research 
tools now complement traditional research work. While traditional tools such as gathering 
data by news agencies, interviews, private investigations and informants continue to be used, 
journalists now also rely on online tools. They use general search engines, news search 
engines, Wikipedia, blogs and social media in their research (Lüneborg and Berghofer, 2010: 
27; Machill, Beiler and Zenker, 2008: 108). Search engines and news search engines account 
respectively for 91 and 69 per cent of online research activities according to a study on 
political journalism (Lüneborg and Berghofer, 2010: 27).  
Almost all traditional media outlets have now established online portals for their 
outlets. Originally a copy of the printed product, online formats have developed into distinct 
outlets in their own right. Journalists had to undergo additional practical training to learn the 
specific tools relevant for online publications and media companies as well as public service 
broadcasters started to allocate budget specifically for their online services. Other media 
outlets sprang up to provide online content without being backed by traditional media houses. 
They now also have the power to influence political debate or serve as forums for opinion 
forming.204  
The latter development denotes the shift the Internet initiated: practically every user 
can become a publisher or journalist. This civic journalism in its various forms is viewed with 
some apprehension: while some see it as helpful and make use of its advantages, for other it 
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precipitates the decrease of journalistic quality. Aspects of civic journalism can also be seen 
in online platforms that work on the basis of the notion of crowd wisdom. The revelations of 
the former Minister’s of Defence plagiarism in his PhD is evidence that a large group within 
the Internet can sufficiently complement the work of traditional journalists. In this case, an 
online forum was established to publically analyse the thesis and compare it with original 
sources. Here, the events on the Internet combined two powerful characteristics: the Internet 
brought together the amount of persons necessary to do the work within a short time and the 
text remained present online and did not simply disappear after a few days. 
Furthermore, the Internet created and requires new types of journalistic fields such as 
data journalism and online journalism with distinct features. Data journalism requires 
profound analysis of raw data material, such as the cables on Wikileaks, or material from 
public authorities, that in themselves do not disclose any immediate meaning to the casual 
reader. Online journalists are specially trained to deal with the distinct technical aspects and 
advantages of online content. 
 45
6. Media literacy and transparency requirements 
 
6.1 The notion of media literacy 
The MEDIADEM project seeks to explore media literacy and transparency requirements in 
the countries under study by focusing on the use of media in a democratic society. This 
includes citizens’ media education in order to make informed choices about the media 
services to choose, and to access and evaluate the quality of the information they receive. The 
societal competency to understand the way the media functions, to engage in critical discourse 
about the media as well as to create one’s own media content lies at the centre of the projects’ 
interest.  
This concept resembles the societal orientated notion prevalent especially in the 
United States of America205 and in the European Commission’s publications.206 The latter 
ascribes to the notion of media literacy, for instance the ‘ability to access the media, to 
understand and critically evaluate different aspects of the media and media content and to 
create communications in a variety of contexts.’ 
This focused understanding of media literacy differs from the notions employed in 
German debates and German literature. Here, media competency, as it is named, stems from 
the concept of media education. Originally, media education was seen as a tool to protect 
media users, especially children, from the negative influence of media consumption (Süss, 
Lampert and Wijnen, 2010: 106). Media competency then came to be seen as the technical 
knowledge to use media for one’s own media productions, which has become now very 
practical with websites such as Youtube and Facebook. The discussion on media competency 
was further instigated by a more comprehensive concept presented by D. Baacke (1997: 98-
99) comprising of the following four aspects: firstly the ability to engage in analytical, 
reflexive and ethical media criticism, secondly, knowledge of the production process for 
media content (i.e. the production of a newspaper, basic legal knowledge of the broadcasting 
system), thirdly, the abilities to use media (such as computer literacy) and, finally the 
knowledge of how to utilise technology to create media content. Media competency should 
enable the user to handle new media information avenues independently and reflectively 
(Baacke 1997: 98). However, understanding in academic literature and thus in practice 
concerning the notion and the dimension of media competency differs.207 The Commission on 
Internet and Society’s working group on media competency in the Federal Parliament 
employs, for example, a definition of media competency based on the understanding of the 
British regulator OFCOM to analyse and gauge existing tools in Germany.208 OFCOM’s 
concept comprises three elements: the ability to use, understand, and create media and 
communications (OFCOM, 2009: 3).209 This is mirrored in the European Commission’s 
publications. This understanding of media education and media literacy, reflected in the 
debates, has presumably influenced practical work and projects in Germany. 
For the purpose of this chapter, the following distinctions shall be drawn and subjects 
addressed to depict an overview of the situation: Firstly, the strategy: what is the aim of a 
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programme, a project and the backing legal foundation? Secondly, the implementation: what 
can be said about the landscape and the projects? Finally, the evaluation: what are the results? 
 
6.2 Strategies 
Media competency follows a protective approach. This is based on the notion that children, 
youth, and adults in general (media users) shall be shielded from negative influence. Concrete 
measures vary, because of the distinct needs of children, youth and adults. Media competency 
focuses on the empowerment of media users to act responsibly when confronted with harmful 
content, be it violence, pornography or phishing attacks for bank account access. Secondly, 
media competency strategies in Germany imply a belief in the need to educate media users 
regarding the special technical knowledge necessary for media consumption and media 
activities. While reading, mathematics and writing belong to the traditional areas of 
knowledge and skill, a fourth area for the online world is now also considered an important 
area. This implies a range of abilities from performing basic search functions in the Internet 
up to interactive communication. Media competency seeks to temper the potential threat of a 
division in the society between those able to create and use online media and those without 
the necessary skills (Baacke, 1997: 96-97). Thirdly, media competency seeks to engender and 
facilitate societal and democratic participation.210 Although media competency is understood 
as the technique of critical and reflective choice and an informed perception of media, 
transparency requirements are not generally part of it. Although the Commission on 
Concentration in the Media regularly publishes very comprehensive concentration reports on 
media ownership and media concentration,211 the objective of this reporting is different. With 
its useful information, it informs media professionals about the current situation but does not 
pursue an overall transparency approach to describing the media landscape in Germany. 
 
6.3 Implementation: the media competency landscape 
The state legislature provides in its state media laws basic provisions on media education and 
media competency and thus entitles the state media authorities to act in this field. The State 
Media Law of North-Rhine Westphalia stipulates that media competency projects shall 
empower media users to handle electronic media in a self-determined, responsible and 
creative way.212 Other state media laws provide comparable regulations.213 The state media 
authorities are funded, among other resources, by the public service broadcasting fees of 
which a part is used for media competency projects. This renders state media authorities 
important actors in this field evidenced in the multitude of co-operative projects 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten, 2011a: 304-322). In addition, a broad array 
of institutions and projects promote media competency, including schools, as media 
competency can be part of the curriculum, the Federal Government’s Ministry for Family, 
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Elderly People, Women, and Youth, the Federal Centre for Political Education as well as 
private initiatives and projects (Böger, 2010).214 
The projects and programmes focus mainly on technical competencies, especially 
online techniques. This implies data protection measurements aiming at handling the risks 
raised when using social network platforms. Furthermore, projects and programmes for 
children and youth protection play a significant role. The necessary knowledge of linkages 
between political or economical interests and media content and the understanding of new 
media services in the Internet for democratic participation, however, seems not to be 
prevalent (Schiffer, 2011: 32). 
 
6.4 Evaluation 
An evaluation of media competency projects, whether they be in schools or as civil society 
projects, faces several difficulties. First of all, what constitutes media competencies is not 
clearly defined. Secondly, media competency programmes address a large variety of 
audiences from preschool children to pensioners and teach technical skills as well as critical 
awareness. Thus, techniques had to be gauged, the critical appraisal of media content analysed 
and conclusions drawn with regard to media behaviour. A model of the Zurich Pedagogic 
University illustrates the sophisticated and differentiated structure underlying media 
competency programmes comprising of four levels of competence in each area of (creating 
media, communicating via media, and critical reflection of media content) (Moser, 2010: 
246). Presumably the complex nature of media competency has led to little scientific research 
of media competency’s results in a way which evaluates the effects of programmes (Süss, 
Lampert and Wijnen, 2010: 113). One example of thorough research is provided by the 
Bielefeld University in its study on media behaviour in youth (Treumann, et al., 2007). 
In short, German media competency initiatives focus on the protection of media users 
(such as which website to visit) and on technical skills. Although the democratic function of 
media competency is acknowledged, awareness-building as to the pressure points that might 
impact on the media and affect its workings does not prevail. 
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7. Conclusion 
Formulation and implementation of media policy supporting media independence and 
plurality necessary for individual and societal democratic communicative processes lay at the 
core of this case study report on Germany. The analysis showed that media policy processes 
and the media landscape currently provide the necessary outlets, press, broadcasting and 
online, to engender public debate and to allow a plurality of opinions to be shared. 
Accounting for this are the regulatory mechanisms in use - comprising of statutory law and 
co-regulatory and self-regulatory instruments which enable the media landscape to function 
and curtail undue influence of state and economic interests -, a viable market, the interest of 
the readers, viewers, and Internet users, as well as a functioning judiciary. However, media 
policy processes are partly disputed, the results contested, and unwarranted influence is 
sometimes exerted on legislatures, media operators and journalists. The debates on public 
service broadcasters’ online activities, political disputes about concentration law and its 
implementation in anticipated cross-media mergers, undue state influence in some public 
service broadcaster governing bodies, the debates on new collective wage agreements, and 
concentration developments in the press all testify to this. 
  The advent of the Internet brought new possibilities for free and independent media, 
but simultaneously challenged the traditional media to adapt to a new technical means. Here, 
some positive developments could be ascertained regarding the perception of Internet-based 
media services. The Federal Parliament initiated a debate on a broad spectrum of issues 
relating to the Internet, establishing a Commission on Internet and Digital Society.215 
Politicians as well as experts with legal, technical, and civil society backgrounds discussed 
and sought to find a common denominator on issues concerning Internet neutrality, data 
protection, intellectual property law and media competency.216 In addition, the Federal 
Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Media organised an expert hearing on the future of 
quality journalism with media experts, focusing on the viability and quality of Internet-based 
media outlets.217 
Some crucial aspects merit attention as they may impinge on the quality of the 
information provided by media outlets or precipitate structural changes detrimental to the 
media’s democratic function. Media policy was once national, and, in the case of Germany, 
clearly defined by state and federal actors. The state governments could decide on 
broadcasting issues, while the federal government addressed competition law, general law, 
and the technical questions regarding telecommunications. The pathways of decision-making 
were well known among the actors and the Federal Constitutional Court remained a last resort 
option in the case of insurmountable political questions. However, with the entrance of new 
supranational actors, such as the European Union, and new technological developments, such 
as the Internet, media regulation (formulation and implementation) in Germany comprises of 
a multi-level system. European Union law influences legislation relevant to media in many 
areas. For example, through the state aid procedure, it provides an influential lever that 
includes the possibility to change the basic structure of the national public service 
broadcasting. Furthermore, the Internet has brought new actors, such as the hard to define 
Internet community, and influential content providers, such as the Google company. As a 
result, applicable media regulation stems from the state, and national, supranational, and 
international governing actors, while relevant processes are influenced, triggered or dispensed 
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by private companies, lobby organisations, and civil society movements. In addition, the 
traditional distinction of the deciding state governments on the one side and the passive 
audience on the other, which prevailed in state broadcasting legislative procedures, seems to 
have blurred. As a result, political procedures have become complex as media law legislation 
encompasses a multitude of actors on different levels and in different forums. It can be 
observed that an exclusive media policy in which once-established competences are protected 
predominates. The complexity could, however, also allow the opening of the process of an 
interrelated media policy and serve new developments. While concentration processes at the 
local or regional level could be addressed more effectively by means of state legislation, 
concentration processes at the European level might be better taken care of at the European 
level. What sounds paradoxical might be very practical: state and national, European, and 
international regulation and standards do not have to exclude each other, but can act in a 
complementary way where necessary to form the legal system. However, this requires a 
different perception of national legislation interacting in a multi-level field of negotiation 
processes.  
 As it was explained in this report, economic and cultural interests might contradict 
each other in the policy forming process and in media law’s implementation. As media outlets 
need sufficient financial foundations to operate, economic interests can impede the free and 
independent media function in providing the content necessary for democratic discourse. It is 
cheaper to repeat television series than to produce time-consuming documentaries, and 
financial means are needed to fund investigative press coverage. However, individuals need a 
communicative space in which ideas can be shared freely in order to be able to decide on 
individual and also societal issues in a democratic procedure. It seems that media policy must 
always balance both shaping forces anew. The newly technical developments and the 
multitude of actors do not mitigate the challenge, although the Basic Law provides guidelines 
as it guarantees in Article 5 free and independent mass communication as one of our cultural 
foundations. At the national level, the conflicts of the private publishers with the public 
service broadcasters, which prevailed in the debates since the public service broadcaster’s 
interception, were transferred to the online activities of public service broadcasters. At the 
European level for instance, the Council of Europe stresses significantly the role of media in 
democracy, while European Union state aid regulation and relevant procedures focus more on 
economic issues. Here, it seems advisable to reflect on the basic democratic function of the 
media. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 11 of the 
European Union Fundamental Rights Charter could pave the way.218 
While political developments change the decision-making processes, technical 
developments have also had fundamental repercussions. In essence, all media outlets have 
come together in one converged platform, the Internet-based receiver, be it a tablet computer, 
a PC, or a smart phone. The distinction of media outlets has blurred. A short on demand video 
published by a newspaper does not differ from a short on demand video by a public service 
broadcaster. However, the sole technical perception of the media obscures the diverse 
function of different outlets. The law has ascribed private broadcasters a different remit and 
role from public service broadcasting, as was described in this report. The figures published 
by state media authorities on politically relevant information aired by private and public 
service programmes testify to this. Press outlets online, news blogs and political information 
websites or blogs assume another function in societal discourses, because they can publish 
comprehensive articles, background information, and complementary resources, like leaked 
original data. They can articulate a more political tone, as a tendency, within the frame of 
journalistic standards. Political blogs or other political information websites can dedicate 
                                                 
218 As for the proposal to introduce the legal concept of public service broadcasting into Article 11 EU-
Fundamental Rights Charter see: Stock, 2002: 583. 
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themselves to distinct subjects and thus assume their own function in societal discourse. 
However, in the end, it is for the society and the politicians responsible for the media to 
decide what kind of online media landscape is preferable. The main question will remain: 
how shall the economical interests be balanced with the societal and democratic need for a 
free and independent communicative space enabling individual and collective opinion 
forming in press, broadcasting, and online outlets? 
 51
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